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2 10 21 
CRIMINAL LAW’S CORE PRINCIPLES 
 




 Modern criminal law scholars and policymakers assume they are free to construct 
criminal law rules by focusing exclusively on the criminal justice theory of the day. But 
this “blank slate” conception of criminal lawmaking is dangerously misguided. In fact, 
lawmakers are writing on a slate on which core principles are already indelibly written 
and realistically they are free only to add detail in the implementation of those 
principles and to add additional provisions not inconsistent with them. Attempts to do 
otherwise are destined to produce tragic results from both utilitarian and retributivist 
views. 
 Many writers dispute that such core principles exist. It is a common view that 
people’s justice judgments are personal to them or perhaps to their small group. If this 
were true, it would present an obstacle if not a permanent barrier to the creation of a 
criminal code that has legitimacy and moral credibility with most persons within its 
jurisdiction. But an investigation of the evidence from a wide variety of sources 
suggests that there does exist a set of core principles upon which humans generally 
agree. 
 This article examines six potential indicators of core principles: principles on which 
empirical studies suggest a high level of agreement across demographics within 
society, principles on which empirical studies suggest agreement cross culturally, 
principles emerging early in the historical development of formal criminal law, 
principles reflected in the universal path of child development, principles reflected in 
the behavior of social animals, and rules and principles regularly appearing in natural 
experiments of human groups beyond the reach of law. We identify nine principles with 
support from most or all of these sources and that properly qualify as near universal 
core principles.  
 One might speculate about why such core principles exist, and the article does, but 
whatever the reason—be it an evolutionarily created genetic predisposition or a 
process of generalized learning common to all social groups—the existence of such 
core principles has important and diverse practical implications: in suggesting reduced 
crime-control effectiveness where the criminal law conflicts with a core principle, in 
setting limitations on and strategies for social reform, in supporting a broader use of 
restorative justice, in suggesting a more nuanced application of the legality principle, in 
supporting the recognition of a general mistake of law defense and a mitigation for 
partial excuses, in assessing the feasibility of creating an international criminal law or 
of creating a criminal law for a territory now being created whose population does not 
yet exist, and even in planning initial contact with extraterrestrial beings.  
 
* Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Ehson Kashfipour made substantial contributions to 
this article, well beyond normal research assistant. Special thanks to Sarah Robinson for her invaluable help. © 
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 Modern criminal law scholars and policymakers appear to assume that they are free to 
construct criminal law rules by focusing exclusively on the criminal justice theory of the day. 
This “blank slate” conception of criminal law drafting displays itself in a stream of criminal law 
rules and practices that dramatically break with prior practice but that logically follow from 
current theory. In the 1970s, policymakers felt comfortable with imposing an automatic life 
sentence for a minor repeat offense, such as a $120 air conditioning fraud, as approved by the 
Supreme Court in the 1980 Rummel case, because, under the theory of the day, such treatment 
of habitual offenders promoted general deterrence and incapacitation of the dangerous.1 This 
same blank-slate attitude is reflected in the comfort with which today’s progressive 
policymakers seek to decriminalize minor thefts and assaults2 or, indeed, to abolish punishment 
altogether.3 
 This article shows, however, that this blank-slate conception of criminal lawmaking is 
false and dangerously misguided. Lawmakers are not writing on a blank slate and ought not feel 
free to formulate any rule supported by the popular theory of the day. Rather, criminal 
lawmakers are writing on a slate on which core principles are already indelibly written and 
realistically they are free only to add detail in the implementation of those principles and to add 
additional provisions not inconsistent with them.  
 But do there even exist such universally shared “core principles” of criminal law? A wide 
range of writers claim no.4 Instead, it is a common view that people’s justice judgments are 
 
1 See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
2 In Suffolk County, prosecutors are ordered not to bring charges for 15 crimes, including shoplifting, larceny under 
$250, and threats. CHARGES TO BE DECLINED, ROLLINS 4 DA, https://rollins4da.com/policy/charges-to-be-declined/. In 
Philadelphia, retail theft under $500 is no longer a misdemeanor but a summary offense in the eyes of 
prosecutors. Maura Ewing, Philadelphia’s New Top Prosecutor Is Rolling Out Wild, Unprecedented Criminal Justice 
Reforms, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:47 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/03/phillys-new-top-
prosecutor-is-rolling-out-wild-unprecedented-criminal-justice-reforms.html?wpsrc=sh_all_dt_tw_ru. In Cook 
County, Illinois prosecutor Kim Foxx “announced she would not prosecute shoplifting as a felony unless the items 
stolen totaled more than $1,000 or the person charged…had at least 10 prior felony convictions.” Steve 
Schmadeke, Top Cook County Prosecutor Raising Bar for Charging Shoplifters with Felony, Chicago Tribune (Dec. 
15, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-kim-foxx-retail-theft-1215-20161214-
story.html. In Dallas, policy reforms “included a decision not to prosecute thefts of personal items under $750 that 
are stolen out of necessity.” Catherine Marfin, Texas Prosecutors Want to Keep Low-level Criminals out of 
Overcrowded Jails. Top Republicans and Police Aren't Happy, TEXAS TRIBUNE (May 21, 2019, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/21/dallas-district-attorney-john-cruezot-not-prosecuting-minor-crimes/. 
3 “Punishment is never fated to ‘succeed’ to any great degree.” A society that “intends to promote disciplined 
conduct and social control will concentrate not upon punishing offenders but upon socializing and integrating 
young citizens – a work of social justice and moral education rather than penal policy.” DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT 
IN MODERN SOCIETY 288-289 (1990). 
4 See, e.g., Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and Punishment at the 
International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 801, 874 (2006) (“The complex beliefs that underwrite 
retributive justice are common to most criminal justice systems, but they are neither universal nor self-evident.”); 
DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE MODERN WORLD 94 (2003) (“[I]nternational criminal law’s 
vocabulary and concepts are not neutral. They are culturally specific, constructed and manipulated by a very small 




“deeply culturally contingent”5 and that there is “enormous variation” in global views towards 
crime and punishment.6 Others argue that “there is a huge amount of cultural variation in the 
real-world application of justice intuitions.”7 Some writers believe that some people may agree 
on some things, typically in extreme cases, but otherwise see no shared intuitions of justice.8  
 But this Article will show that there are indeed universal principles of criminal liability 
and punishment that ordinary people share and, further, for good utilitarian and retributivist 
reasons, ought not be violated and, as a practical matter, cannot be altered. Further, 
recognizing the existence of these core principles provides a wide range of insights concerning 
the proper formulation and reform of criminal law, and more. 
 How might one demonstrate the existence of such core principles of criminal liability 
and punishment? Part II identifies a wide variety of sources that one could use, including 
studies of high agreement levels within a society for certain principles, studies showing high 
cross-cultural levels of agreement, evidence showing the universal path of child development in 
all humans, animal studies that show precursors to such human justice judgments, historical 
review of the principles and doctrines that emerged earliest in formal criminal law, and the 
emergence of common principles regularly adopted by groups caught in “natural experiments” 
beyond the reach of law. Drawing on these many different sources, and especially on the strong 
overlap among them, Part III offers and documents a series of core principles suggested by the 
Part II sources. 
 If such core principles exist, one may wonder how this could possibly be so, given that 
judgments of justice seem so complex and concern such nuanced matters. One might think that 
people’s views on such issues would be influenced primarily by their life experiences. Cultural, 
economic, religious, familial, educational, social, political, and emotional forces could be 
powerful forces on people’s judgments of justice. For core principles to exist, their source must 
be something more powerful than any and all of these combined life experiences and 
influences. What could that source of common influence possibly be? Part IV offers some 
speculation: hypothesizing a human predisposition toward accepting such core principles, a 
predisposition that was evolutionarily advantageous because acceptance of the core principles 
within a human group was a necessary prerequisite for maintaining the group cooperation 
essential to the success of the human species. 
 Whatever the reason for their existence, the fact that core principles do exist has 
significant practical implications for a modern society. As Part V explains, the existence of core 
principles can have an effect in determining the best distributive principles for criminal liability 
and punishment, in setting strategies for using criminal law to change societal norms, in 
 
VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 637 (2012) (“despite some level of uniformity of global views toward crime and punishment, 
there is also evidence of enormous variation—enough variation to threaten the legitimacy of an institution that 
claims to enforce universal norms.”). 
5 Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
539, 551 (2005). 
6 Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 637 
(2012). 
7 Andrew K. Woods, Moral Judgments & International Crimes: The Disutility of Desert, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 633, 651 
(2012). 
8 “[E]veryone may agree that five years in prison is unjustly harsh desert for shoplifting, or that a five dollar fine is 
unjustly lenient desert for rape, but beyond such clear cases our intuitions seem to fail us. Is two years, five years, 
or ten years the proper sanction for a rape? . . . Our sense of just deserts here seems to desert us.” Leo Katz, 




formulating specific criminal law doctrines, and in assessing the feasibility of having a criminal 
law that governs many different communities, such as federal criminal law or even 
international criminal law. 
 
II. Six Potential Indicators of Core Principles 
 
 Each of the following categories of sources or indicators can suggest the existence of a 
core principle. These sources—historical, national and international empirical surveys, child 
development, animal studies, and natural real-world experiments—are dramatically different in 
nature. A principle suggested by most of these sources would seem to suggest some depth of 
support, perhaps enough to suggest that the principle is shared by humans generally. After the 
introduction of these six sources here, Part III uses these sources to identify what might be 
near-universal core principles. 
 
A. Principles on Which There Is High Agreement Within Society 
 
 Empirical evidence of widespread agreement on a principle would seem to be rather 
direct support that the principle is near universal. As demonstrated in Part III, the empirical 
evidence suggests a quite strong agreement on a wide variety of liability and punishment issues 
across demographics. 
 Research conducted by myself and Robert Kurzban demonstrate just how nuanced 
these shared intuitions of justice are. In one study, participants were given twenty-four short 
scenarios on separate cards and were asked to rank-order the cards to reflect the amount of 
punishment deserved in each.9 The scenarios included such offenses as theft by taking, theft by 
fraud, property destruction, assault, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, rape, negligent homicide, 
manslaughter, murder, and torture in a variety of situations, including self-defense, 
provocation, duress, mistake, and mental illness. The kinds of offenses in the scenarios 
represent 94.9% of the offenses committed in the United States. The study demonstrated that 
shared intuitions regarding the relative seriousness of wrongdoing were very strong. The 
amount of agreement shown in the study—96% of all pairwise judgments, and a Kendall’s W of 
0.95—represents an extraordinary result. In a follow-up study conducted online, we again 
found an extraordinarily high level of agreement, despite the potential for a large increase in 
the amount of “noise” due to the format of the study.10 
 
B. Principles on Which There Is Agreement Cross Culturally 
 
 Also useful are studies of agreement on intuitions of justice that extend beyond a single 
society or nation. There exist vast differences in ecology, history, demographics, social 
structure, and many other variables from one group and culture to another. These differences 
are so striking and of such a nature that it seems odd that all groups would set upon the same 
 
9 PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 29 (2013). 




justice norms. That is, it might seem surprising that dramatic differences in social structure and 
social resources would have no effect on existing justice judgments. 
 Consensus on a justice principle despite the significant differences across cultures seems 
indicative of a principle that stems from some deeper human intuition. For instance, the cross-
cultural empirical evidence appears to support the view that people everywhere share some 
intuitions of justice about the relative blameworthiness of serious wrongdoing. One such study, 
conducted by Graeme Newman, sampled 2,360 individuals from a number of different 
countries—India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, United States, and Yugoslavia—chosen for their 
supposed important cultural differences.11 Subjects were asked to rate certain serious offenses 
on a 12-point scale.12 Newman reports that “[a]t the general level of analysis, it is apparent that 
there was considerable agreement as to the amount of punishment appropriate to each act” 
and that looking at relative rankings indicates “general agreement in ranks across all 
countries.”13 
 
C. Principles Emerging Early in the Historical Development of Formal Criminal Law 
 
 A principle that appears early in the historical record and remains accepted today would 
seem to be a good candidate for a core principles list: it is telling that, even in a world with little 
legal sophistication or precedent, that long-ago generation felt strongly enough about the 
principle to articulate it on their own. Also, because it appeared early, its widespread 
acceptance cannot to be attributed to generations of internalization. Take, for example, the 
right of self-defense. This defense was recognized in the earliest of criminal laws, including the 
Code of Hammurabi dating to about 1754 B.C.E., and was similarly codified in fourth century 
C.E. Roman law which stated “we grant to all persons the unrestricted power to defend 
themselves” (Iiberam resistendi cunctis tribuimus facultatem).14 Other early sources of criminal 
law principles drawn upon in this Article include the laws of ancient Athens and early English 
law. 
 
D. Principles Reflected in the Universal Path of Child Development 
 
 All humans develop according to a predetermined universal path that includes not just 
predictable physiological milestones but also fixed timing and content for the development of 
moral intuitions. This tends to support the theory that certain principles of criminal law are 
innate to humans. In the same way that baby teeth grow from gums and adult teeth replace 
baby teeth, intuitions about morality and justice come online according to a relatively 
predictable sequence. Furthermore, intuitions about injury, theft, and fairness are among the 
first principles of justice understood by young children. As suggested by Jerome Kagan, 
“temporal concordance implies a biologically based preparedness to judge acts as right or 
 
11 GRAEME NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCES: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES 140 (1976). 
12 Id. at 116 tbl.4. 
13 Id. at 140-41. (See tbl.12, pp. 142-43). 




wrong, where preparedness is used with the same sense intended by linguists who claim that 
two-year-old children are prepared to speak their language.”15 
 Imagine the reverse case. If there were no specific developmental system for the 
acquisition of moral intuitions, if intuitions of justice were simply a matter of general social 
learning, then the developmental route of the acquisition of intuitions of justice would depend 
on the environment in which a child developed. The things that the child learned were wrong 
would include acts the child witnessed, ideas communicated through language, pedagogy from 
various sources, and so forth. Because all of these elements are likely to differ widely across 
civilizations, cultures, and even across family and peer groups within cultures, such a general 
learning system would yield very different paths and timing in the acquisition of intuitions of 
justice for different individuals. 
 Although evidence now suggests that moral reasoning develops relatively early, it is 
likely that research still does not fully reveal the precociousness of such reasoning. John Darley 
and Thomas Shultz suggest in their broad review that “children are capable of making moral 
judgments at a much earlier age than previously thought.”16 Summarizing recent literature, the 
authors conclude that “moral capacity is well developed although by no means completely 
developed in the third year of life.”17 To the extent that very young children have intuitions, 
acquire knowledge, and make conceptual distinctions, especially universally, the probability 
that each child acquires these by general learning processes decreases, and a more innate 
developmental sequence becomes more likely. 
 
E. Social Behavior and Practices Revealed by Animal Studies 
 
 Part IV describes how humans, as an ultra-social species, may owe much of their success 
to embracing the core principles discussed in Part III. As a social species, humans benefit when 
there exist agreed-upon rules around, among other things, harming one another or taking 
another’s property. If such basic principles were not universally accepted by humans, then 
humanity would be internally destructive and less capable of advancing its species as a whole. 
As such, one might expect to find in other animals that also exhibit social behavior rudimentary 
forms of humans’ core intuitions about what constitutes wrongdoing and the intuition that 
wrongdoing should be punished. This is especially so among primates. In fact, a number of 
socially cooperative species appear in some circumstances to exhibit these characteristics of 
“punishing” aggressors and cheaters according to some basic principles of justice. Individuals 
that deviate from various group norms and expectations are sometimes ostracized or aggressed 
against by the victims, the victim’s relatives, or others. And a number of researchers now 
suggest that such behaviors may reflect a rudimentary moral sense or intuition of justice. 
 For an example of an animal study that suggests that some animals, especially those 
that depend on social groups, do have clear intuitions of justice, consider the research of a 
 
15 Jerome Kagan, Introduction, in THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN x (Jerome Kagan & Sharon Lamb 
eds., 1987). 
16 John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525, 552 
(1990). 





widely reported experiment with capuchin monkeys.18 Different combinations of two adjacent 
monkeys regularly returned granite tokens for slices of cucumber. When the experimenter 
began to provide one monkey in a dyad with a grape (a more highly valued food) in exchange 
for the same token that continued to yield mere cucumbers for the other monkey, the other 
monkey often manifested considerable distress. It sometimes jumped up and down, throwing 
the token or the cucumber at the researcher, refusing to eat the cucumber, and the like. This 
led the authors of the study to conclude that capuchins are capable of comparing their own 
reward to the reward others receive, and accepting or rejecting rewards according to their 
relative, not absolute, value. Behavior suggesting an ability to perceive inequities appears to 
underlie a great deal of social behavior in primates, in whom transgressive acts are most 
systematically punished. But, as discussed in Part III, these phenomena are not limited to 
primates or even to mammals. 
 
F. Rules and Principles Appearing in Natural Experiments of Groups Beyond the Reach of Law 
 
 Today, we are surrounded by governmental law, but what would be our basic human 
nature without its influence? Could we even imagine a life without it? Luckily, the accidents of 
history and the unpredictability of life give us some enlightening instances in which we can 
glimpse humans living outside of the influence of law and society, cases where a group is not 
only out of law’s reach but, they assume, will probably remain so. Our world and our history are 
rich with such natural experiments, most of which no one would volunteer for, but survivors of 
such events can tell us the data-rich tale. 
 A plane crashes on a remote mountain or a ship wrecks on an isolated island. People 
might still conform out of fear that later they will be called to account by the law. If the group 
thinks it might soon be rescued, this is no true test. But what if there is no realistic prospect of 
rescue, how do the survivors deal with one another? Once they feel completely free of legal 
constraints, how do isolated individuals behave with each other? Such absent-law situations 
have occurred in a wide variety of settings beyond plane crashes and shipwrecks. A group may 
be forced into permanent isolated exile, as with the forced creation of leper colonies in the 
middle of the nineteenth century. Or a group may choose to isolate itself, as with groups of 
pirates at the start of the eighteenth century. 
 Despite the fact that there are dramatic differences between the situations and the 
people in these law-less groups, there turn out to be common patterns in the rules and 
principles they create for themselves to define and punish wrongdoing. That these groups, in 
such desperate circumstances, would adopt similar principles suggests that these cases offer 
another source for identifying core principles that seem to be naturally shared by most humans.  
 
 
18 Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 297 (2003); Sarah Brosnan & Frans de 
Waal, Reply, 428 NATURE 140 (2004). See also Sarah Brosnan, Nonhuman Species’ Reactions to Inequity and their 




III. Core Principles 
 
  Looking to these potential indicators, what core principles do they suggest? Below are 
nine principles that have independent support from the many different indicators described in 
the previous section. 
 
A. The Punishment Principle: Wrongdoing Deserves Punishment 
 
 The first principle suggested by the six indicators is the fundamental shared belief that 
blameworthy wrongdoing deserves punishment. The nearly universal nature of this principle is 
strongly supported by a wide variety of the sources discussed in Part II. 
Human civilizations as early as ancient Athens viewed wrongdoing as giving rise to anger 
in the victim that could be assuaged only by punishment. But it was not just the personal sense 
of wrong by the victim but also the sense of wrong by the community generally. As 
Demosthenes argued in a public prosecution in the 360s B.C.E.: “It’s not right that Meidias’ 
behavior should arouse my indignation alone and slip by, overlooked by the rest of you. Not at 
all. Really, it’s necessary for everyone to be equally angry!”19 
 The Punishment Principle is well documented by empirical studies, both domestic and 
cross cultural. One example is the so-called Ultimatum Game, a study which tests respondents’ 
willingness to bear the costs to punish perceived unfairness. In the typical version, experimental 
subjects are brought into the laboratory and randomly assigned to one of two experimental 
“roles,” either that of the Proposer or the Responder. The Proposer is provisionally allocated a 
sum of money, called an “Endowment,” often ten dollars. The Proposer suggests a split of the 
Endowment with the Responder, for example, six dollars for the Proposer, four dollars for the 
Responder. The Responder is then given the option of accepting the offer, in which case the 
money is split as designated by the Proposer, or rejecting the proposal, in which case the ten 
dollars is not given to the subjects. 
 Proposers generally offer between 40% to 50% of the Endowment to Responders,20 but 
our interest is in situations in which Proposers offer a very unequal split. Under these 
conditions, Responders often reject the proposals, costing them the amount offered by the 
Proposer, and thus depriving the Proposer of her portion of the money. Such rejections are 
interpreted by researchers as cases in which Responders are punishing Proposers for making 
unfair offers. This punishment happens under carefully controlled conditions, when the 
subjects do not physically interact with one another, do not know one another’s identities, and 
when even the experimenter does not know the Responder’s decision. In short, people punish 
perceived unfairness at a cost to themselves, even when there are no instrumental 
consequences or experimenter expectations at work. Even more striking, there is evidence that 
third-party observers with no stake in the game will pay to punish Proposers they perceive as 
behaving intentionally unfairly towards Responders.21 
 Another source of empirical evidence in support of the punishment principle is the large 
literature on scenario research. Where subjects are asked their view on the amount of 
 
19 Demosthenes 21.123, from Punishment in Ancient Athens, Danielle S. Allen, edition of March 23, 2003, available 
at http://www.stoa.org/demos/article_punishment@page=all&greekEncoding=UnicodeC.html. 
20 This varies considerably depending on the details of the experimental procedure. See COLIN CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL 
GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 50-52 (2003). 




punishment that would be appropriate, they always respond but rarely take the no punishment 
option. For example, a study by Craig Boydell and Carl Grindstaff gave participants the 
opportunity to indicate the penalty they believed should be applied to an offense, as well as the 
appropriate minimum and maximum penalty.22 Even for the least serious offense they 
investigated—assault—a mere four percent of respondents indicated that the minimum 
penalty they would apply is “no punishment.”23 For all other crimes, “no punishment” was 
chosen as the appropriate penalty by fewer than four percent of the respondents. Indeed, in 
the majority of cases, “no punishment” was selected by no participants, even as the minimum 
punishment for the offense.24 
 Similarly, a 1985 study allowed people to indicate zero in their magnitude estimation 
task when questioned about the appropriate punishment for certain offenses.25 The average 
value assigned for even the offense judged least serious—“a person under 16 years old plays 
hooky from school”—was greater than zero.26 On average, across all regions investigated, even 
the least serious offense was judged to deserve some punishment. 
 In many questionnaire studies, “no liability” was not an option given, likely because the 
experimenters believed that all subjects would find that all acts described in the study deserved 
at least some punishment. This assumption itself is noteworthy as it shows that a standard 
assumption made by social science experts over the course of decades is that subjects would 
obviously choose to apply at least some punishment. If all of these researchers were wrong, 
there likely would be evidence in the studies of subjects refusing to assign punishment, by 
responding with only the minimum possible amount of punishment in each case, or by 
responding randomly. Yet these types of results did not occur, vindicating the researchers’ 
views. 
 Cross-cultural data suggest that questionnaire studies yield similar results in all of the 
cultures that have been studied. While clearly there are important cultural differences, the 
intuition that those who commit wrongs should be punished seems to be universal. Cultural 
psychologist Paul Rozin and his colleagues conclude that “[m]oral judgment and the 
condemnation of others, including fictional others and others who have not harmed the self, is 
a universal and essential feature of human social life.”27 Similar sentiments have been 
expressed by developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan, who includes this intuition as one of a 
limited number of “universal moral categories that transcend time and locality.”28 Philosopher 
Ray Jackendoff observes: “Thus in our culture, the legal system punishes not only physical 
aggression like assault, but also economic aggression like stealing. Similar institutions are found 
 
22 Craig L. Boydell and Carl F. Grindstaff, Public Opinion Toward Sanctions for Crimes of Violence, 65 J. CRIM. L. 113, 
116 (1974). 
23 See id. at 114. (Note: The penultimate column, labeled “education,” is mislabeled and should read “execution” 
(see p. 115 for a confirmation of this error) and should therefore not be interpreted as a preference for “no 
punishment.”) 
24 Id. 
25 MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF CRIME SEVERITY, app. A at 137 (1985) (the instructions read: “If 
YOU think something should not be a crime, give it a zero.”) (emphasis in original). 
26 See id. at 158-61. 
27 Paul Rozin, Laura Lowery, Sumio Imada & Jonathan Haidt, The CAD Triad Hypothesis: A Mapping Between Three 
Moral Emotions (Contempt, Anger, Disgust) and Three Moral Codes (Community, Autonomy, Divinity), 76 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 574 (1999). 




in some form in every culture, even in the absence of written legal codes.”29 Anthropologist 
Donald Brown, in his exhaustive review of the cross-cultural data, includes intuitions 
surrounding justice and punishing transgressors as a “Human Universal.”30 
 The universal path of child development lends further support to the Punishment 
Principle. From a young age, children demonstrate a belief that wrongdoing is deserving of 
punishment. In an early and well-known experiment, Judith Smetana tested very young 
children’s beliefs about justice to determine if wrongdoing, specifically physical harm (hitting) 
and theft (taking someone else’s apple), should be punished.31 Smetana used pictures 
indicating the acts to demonstrate violations. To elicit responses, a pictorial scale (different-size 
frowns) was used to gauge seriousness. Smetana also used a verbal assessment of how harshly 
the offender should be punished: not at all, a little, or a lot. Both groups of subjects—consisting 
of children between two-and-a-half to five years old—indicated that hitting and theft were 
both serious offenses and deserved punishment. The children indicated that these offenses 
would be wrong even if “there [were] no rule about it.”32  
Perhaps even more telling is the great lengths children are willing to go to ensure that 
wrongdoers get the punishment they deserve. Similar to the adults in the Ultimatum Game, 
research has shown that children are willing to make personal sacrifices, such as by giving up 
stickers, candies, or time playing on a slide, “to punish a transgressor who had acted unfairly or 
unkindly.”33 This result is consistent among children across cultures.34 
 In fact, the Punishment Principle is so fundamental that it extends beyond humans. A 
number of socially cooperative species appear in some circumstances to “punish” aggressors 
and cheaters. Individuals that deviate from various group norms and expectations are 
sometimes isolated or aggressed against by the victims, the victim’s relatives, and others. 
 For example, within the highly social naked-mole rat communities, queens appear to 
focus attacks on lazy workers.35 In one social species of wren, “helpers” assist by providing food 
when the young are being raised. Helpers experimentally removed from the group during that 
period are usually attacked and harassed upon their return, while helpers absent at other times 
of the year are never attacked.36 Wolves apparently refuse to play with those who violate the 
social rule against injurious play-fighting, and the latter both leave the group and die at higher 
rates than average.37 And young male deer attempting to sneak copulations with females being 
guarded by adult males are regularly attacked.38 
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 Primates in particular exhibit sophisticated cooperation, which ranges from simple 
reciprocal grooming and food sharing to complex tool-using and coalitional behavior. They, too, 
regularly punish wrongdoers. In chimpanzee societies, for example, those reluctant to share 
when they have food are more likely to encounter aggressive responses when they later 
approach those who have food.39 Chimpanzees will attack former allies who failed to assist 
them in conflicts with third parties. Indeed, among chimpanzees (which, along with bonobos, 
are the closest relatives of humans), retribution is sufficiently common that researchers 
consider retaliation “an integral part of [a] system of reciprocity.”40 
 Even in absent-law situations, group members create systems for punishing wrongdoing 
amongst themselves. In the early 1840s, thousands of families traveled from Missouri to 
California, Utah, and Oregon along the Oregon Trail motivated by a stagnant American 
economy and the prospect of free land. Wagon trains formed in the winter in Independence, 
Missouri where the travelers worked out agreements concerning leadership, supplies, and 
finances. There was no U.S. legal authority present, and indeed the trains were not traveling 
across U.S. territory during much of their travel. Each train made up its own rules. At a rate of 
three miles per hour, a wagon train could make the two-thousand-mile journey before the 
autumn snows blocked the mountain passes only with no delays. Those trapped in the 
mountains could die without food or shelter. Nevertheless, one of the few things that would 
prompt a train to voluntarily stop was for the trial and punishment of serious wrongdoing. Even 
unrelated trains were known to halt their journey to participate as the jury for a trial which had 
nothing to do with them.41 
 For a different kind of example, consider the prisoners in Nazi concentration camps 
during World War II. During the War, the Nazis rounded up and transported Jews, as well as 
homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, communists, and gypsies, from all over Europe into camps 
that had been built expressly for the purpose of annihilating them. Those who were not killed 
upon arrival fought to survive against disease, brutality, starvation, and overwork.42 
 Prisoners in the camps commonly hid away small scraps of bread among their 
possessions. The precious bread crusts could mean the difference between life and death. 
Volunteers, at some significant personal sacrifice, took turns staying up at night to stand guard. 
But the commitment to catching and punishing those who victimized the weak was thought to 
outweigh the personal cost. 
 There were some prisoners who for whatever reason mistreated their fellows or even 
actively participated in torturing them, sometimes to death. The German SS who controlled the 
camps had no inclination to punish such acts. In fact, prisoners known to be cruel to their fellow 
prisoners were protected. Behind the scenes, however, prisoner justice was at work, and the 
protected “creatures” were often killed, commonly by prisoners who had not been their 
victims, had nothing personal to gain, and who put themselves at risk in doing so. One of the 
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malevolent prisoners, Gregory Kushnir-Kushnarev, who claimed to be a former Russian general, 
was protected by the SS. But when he fell ill and went to the camp doctor (a fellow prisoner), 
the doctor by prearrangement declared him to be infectious and admitted him to the hospital, 
where other prisoners killed him by lethal injection. This kind of personal sacrifice in order to 
impose deserved punishment, even by persons unrelated to the victim, appears regularly in 
law-less situations.43 
 There have been multiple attempts at creating “no-punishment” societies. For instance, 
during the 1960s social revolution, some established anti-punishment communes in order to 
prove to the world that people could live together in an open society that maximized autonomy 
while protecting the rights of others. One of the most famous of these communes was Drop 
City, established in May 1965 on six acres of scrub land outside of Trinidad, Colorado. The 
commune became a rich incubator for artistic and social creativity, including the development 
of geodesic domes made from junk car hoods as living quarters. Open to all, there were no 
formal enforced rules, but it was entirely appropriate for a member to complain to another 
about how the person’s conduct hurt others.44 
 Things went well for a while but when one member, Peter Rabbit (most residents took 
new names) followed his own mind and dismissed others’ complaints, the group’s inability to 
enforce its norms undid the project. Peter Rabbit took the absence of enforcement as an 
opportunity to promote his personal interests at the expense of others.45 On one occasion, he 
was found eating a steak at a local restaurant using funds he took from the communal bank 
account, an account to which he never contributed. As members increasingly resented his open 
thievery and their helplessness in the face of it, they stopped cooperating and the commune 
collapsed. 
 As Drop City was disbanding, a different group established a no-punishment commune 
at Black Bear Ranch in Siskiyou County, California.46 They, too, began with no enforced rules. 
But after a series of fights, outbreaks of hepatitis, and a growing proportion of freeloaders, 
formal rules were adopted and enforced by required appearances before the community for 
open discussion. If the coercion of social stigmatization was ineffective, the offending member 
was expelled. The Black Bear commune’s adoption of a coercive enforcement system saved it, 
and it continues to exist today. All no-punishment communes, like Drop City, have failed.47 
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B. The Meaning of Wrongdoing 
 
  The previous principle provides for the punishment of wrongdoing, but is there 
agreement on what constitutes wrongdoing? The indicators suggest at least three near 
universal aspects of the meaning of wrongdoing: physical aggression, taking the property of 
another without consent, and deceit in exchanges. As described below, the indicators also point 
to a near universal acceptance of accomplice liability and a defense for otherwise wrongful 
conduct necessary to avoid a greater harm. As suggested earlier, additional research may 
suggest other areas of agreement. This principle seems particularly ripe for further 
development. 
 
1. Wrongdoing includes physical aggression, taking property without consent, and 
deceit in exchanges 
 
 Admittedly, there can be considerable variation in what types of conduct are considered 
wrong across groups, cultures, and civilizations. However, there does exist a core of conduct in 
which there is extraordinary agreement: physical aggression and taking another’s property 
without consent. These acts were forbidden in criminal laws as early as 2300 B.C.E., when 
Urukagina, the King of the city-states of Lagash and Girsu in Mesopotamia, took measures 
against murder, theft, and usury among other conduct in the first example of a legal code in 
recorded history.48 
 In empirical studies, offenses against persons and property are regularly chosen as being 
among the most egregious. For example, Joseph Jacoby and Francis Cullen surveyed a national 
sample of 1920 adults who were read eight crime vignettes during thirty-minute telephone 
interviews.49 The type of crime in each vignette was taken from a list of twenty-four offenses. 
On average, respondents agreed on the relative seriousness of each crime. Assaults, rapes, 
robberies, and larceny (particularly of greater dollar amounts) were all seen as deserving 
significant punishment.50 
 
 The same result can be found in cross-cultural studies. For example, Michael O’Connell 
and Anthony Whelan’s survey of 623 individuals in the greater Dublin area showed that 
respondents viewed murder, assault, burglary, and mugging as particularly wrongful.51 The 
same was found by Marlene Hsu in Taiwan,52 and by Graeme Newman in India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Italy, and Yugoslavia.53 
 Nor are these sentiments limited to adults. In the aforementioned Judith Smetana study 
of very young children’s beliefs about justice, physical harm (hitting) and theft (taking someone 
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else’s apple) were clearly seen as forms of wrongdoing to be punished.54 In another study, Elliot 
Turiel found that the vast majority of children believe the absence of a rule prohibiting stealing 
would be wrong, and that “it would be wrong to steal even if the rule did not exist.”55 This 
nonrelativistic view, he concluded, “corresponds to their judgments about the act of stealing.”56 
Physical aggression and theft were also commonly punished even in absent-law 
situations. For example, residents of San Francisco, the base camp for the gold rush in the mid-
1800s with no functioning government, formed a vigilante court and grand jury for the purpose 
of indicting and charging a criminal gang, the Hounds, with “conspiracy to commit murder [and] 
robbery.”57 And in the Nazi concentration camps mentioned above, prisoners who physically 
mistreated or stole bread from their fellows were the recipients of prisoner justice, often being 
killed for their wrongdoings.58 
 Finally, condemnation of physical aggression and theft can be found even in non-human 
species. In rhesus macaques, for example, those who discover food and are caught having failed 
to alert the group to its discovery often become targets of significant aggression.59 Elephant 
seal pups caught trying to nurse from a female who is not their mother are not just shooed 
away but often bitten severely and sometimes killed.60 
 In addition to physical harm and the taking of property, deceit in exchanges is similarly 
universally understood as a wrong. Take the example of children’s inclination towards fairness. 
Larry Nucci asserts that “[t]he great accomplishment of early-childhood moral development is 
the construction of moral action tied to structures of ‘just’ reciprocity.”61 Further research 
shows that while young children (age five or less) are incapable of connecting effort or work to 
reward (instead allocating rewards equally), children as young as thirteen begin to allocate 
rewards with a proportionality (equity) rule, suggesting a developmental trend in issues 
associated with exchange (effort for reward).62 
 Social behavior in primates demonstrates that humans are not alone in demanding fair 
exchange. For example, in the capuchin monkey experiment noted earlier, what upset the 
capuchin was the perception that they were being cheated in their exchange of their granite 
token for food, given the greater reward that the neighboring capuchin was receiving.63 
Similarly, chimpanzees reportedly often refuse to participate in an exchange once another 
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chimpanzee is receiving a more valued reward for the same amount of effort.64 Thus, both 
capuchins and chimpanzees behave in ways suggesting that they can perceive unfairness in 
exchanges and that it often agitates them. 
 Absent-law groups similarly show an inclination to punish not only physical aggression 
and theft but also deceit in exchanges. In the San Francisco gold mining camps mentioned 
above, for example, one of the offenses prosecuted by residents was deception in a horse 
sale.65 
 
 2. Assisting another person to commit a crime is wrongful 
 
  Complicity and conspiracy became separate and distinct doctrines in criminal law at 
least by the sixteenth century.66 The criminalization of unlawful agreements by a group came 
early in common law but, “[i]t was not until 1611 in the Poulterers’ Case, decided in the Court 
of Star Chamber, that a mere agreement to commit a crime became a substantive offense.”67 
The Poulterers’ Case is a landmark in the history of criminal conspiracy, for it departed from the 
doctrine that the conspiracy must actually be carried into effect before a writ of conspiracy 
would lie. The Court of Star Chamber ruled in that case that the agreement was itself indictable 
though the offense had not taken place.68 But Legal accountability for the criminal conduct of 
another was well-established even before there was a formal doctrine to in either tort or 
criminal law. As Francis Sayre explains, “[s]uch a doctrine rests… upon natural reason and 
elementary principles of causation than upon any fiction of law.”69 
 Absent-law groups also prosecuted those who were complicit in the commission of 
wrongdoing. When the residents of the San Francisco gold mining camps formed a committee 
to try the Hounds for their violence, the Hounds were “indicted, and charged with a conspiracy 
to commit murder, robbery, etc.”70 The committee did not seek to charge each individual 
Hound with specific crimes, but rather found that each member’s complicity in the group’s 
activities sufficed to banish the group entirely.71 
 Empirical studies confirm near universal agreement that complicity constitutes 
wrongdoing. Indeed, people’s judgments on these issues are quite nuanced. People’s liability 
and punishment judgments dramatically alter according to how much assistance an accomplice 
provides in the commission of an offense. For example, in one study concerning accomplice 
liability for a perpetrator’s killing during a store robbery, where the accomplice agrees 
beforehand to the shooting, his punishment is 30 years to life when the principal shoots the 
store owner. But if the accomplice thought the principal’s gun would be unloaded, his liability is 
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only 6.6 years for the owner’s death.72 And if the principal shoots a cofelon rather than the 
store owner, then the surviving cofelon’s punishment is only 12 months.73 
 Another study sought to test the subjects’ view of the minimum amount that a person 
could contribute in encouraging or assisting an offense to be held criminally liable for it. It also 
sought to test whether the subjects would alter the degree of the liability they imposed 
according to the person’s degree of contribution to the offense.74 The study presented subjects 
with a series of scenarios, each of which presented a different degree of contribution to a 
killing, including scenarios where the person attempted but failed to assist.75 In order to test 
whether the subjects’ view depended upon the actual occurrence of a resulting harm, such as 
death, several of the scenarios presented instances where the principal actor, the 
“perpetrator,” was not successful in his attempt to kill.  
 As the involvement of the friend goes from failed attempt, to minimal, up through 
masterminding of the crime, the liability ratings of the respondents increase. The man who 
helps a woman in planning the killing of her husband by directing her to a gun store is given an 
average liability of five years, while the man who helps her by giving her his gun so she does not 
have to go to the store gets an average of life imprisonment. But if he offers her his gun but she 
says she does not need it (because she already has one), then 85% say no punishment.76 That is, 
the liability assignments to the friend increase as his contribution to the offense increases. 
 
 3. Conduct necessary to avoid a greater harm is not wrongful 
 
 What today might be called justification defenses, especially defensive force 
justifications, were recognized early in the development of criminal law. A right of self-defense 
against an unlawful aggressor is probably the earliest recognized exception to the general 
prohibition against injuring or killing another. The defense was recognized in the earliest of 
criminal laws, including the Code of Hammurabi.77 
 Roman law similarly codified the defense. Roman law was protective of the individual’s 
right to defend himself and his property, whether from a thief on a darkened highway or a 
soldier in search of plunder. A provision attributed to late fourth century C.E. reads:  
 
We grant to all persons the unrestricted power to defend themselves . . . , so that it is 
proper to subject anyone, whether a private person or a soldier, who trespasses upon 
fields at night in search of plunder, or lays by busy roads plotting to assault passers-by, 
to immediate punishment in accordance with the authority granted to all. Let him suffer 
the death which he threatened and incur that which he intended.78  
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The offered rationale for the provision states, “[f]or it is better to meet the danger at the time, 
than to obtain legal redress after one’s death.”79 
 Empirical studies also demonstrate a common intuition that necessary defensive force 
ought not to be punished. The control scenario in one study involves a case in which a person is 
attacked with a deadly weapon and responds by killing the attacker.80 Participants’ assignment 
of liability in this study was vanishingly low, on average assigning well below one day in jail. Of 
the respondents, 71% gave no liability; 97% gave no liability or no punishment.81 This result 
confirms that subjects give a defense to a person who kills under conditions that satisfy today’s 
legal requirements for self-defense. 
 The right of self-defense was also recognized by absent-law groups in determining 
liability and punishment. Recall the wagon train communities discussed previously, who made 
and enforced their own rules. They dealt with serious wrongdoing according to the group’s own 
shared intuitions of justice. Abigail Jane Scott recorded a case in which her train delayed for a 
day to participate in the trial of a man from a train ahead of them. The facts presented at the 
trial revealed that 
 
Dunmore followed [Olmstead] and jumping upon him commenced beating him and 
endeavored to kick him in the face with his boots; Olmsted called upon the bystanders 
to take him off saying at the same time that he had a k[n]ife; As no one interfered he 
stabbed him in the lower part of the chest; Upon this Dunmore started back and 
exclaimed that he was stabbed. He fell and in twenty minutes was a corpse. The group 
judged Olmstead to be blameless and as having acted in proper self-defense, and no 
liability was imposed.82 
 
Children similarly view necessary harm as morally distinguishable from malevolent 
aggression. In one study, Marc Jambon and Judith Smetana sought to examine 5- to 11-year-
olds’ judgements as to the justifiability of causing intentional harm to prevent greater injury. 
The subjects were shown a series of colored drawings depicting a story where an actor 
intentionally hurt his or her friend to stop the friend from performing an act that would likely 
cause serious psychological or physical harm. The researchers concluded that “with age 
participants offered increasingly more forgiving evaluations of necessary harm.”83 
 
 
C. The Blameworthiness Principle: Blameless Conduct Should Be Protected from Criminal 
Liability 
 
 The indicators suggest that there is near universal agreement that criminal liability and 
punishment ought to be imposed only where there is some degree of blameworthiness for the 
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wrongdoing. In modern terms, this principle insists on some minimum level of criminal 
culpability (intention, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence) as to the elements of the 
offense, as well as a minimum level of cognitive and control capacity by the offender at the 
time of the offense typically provided through the recognition of a range of excuse defenses. 
 
1. An actor with no culpable state of mind as to the offense is not blameworthy 
 
 Even if an actor’s conduct is wrongful (the actor violates a criminal law conduct rule), 
there is strong agreement that he ought not be criminally liable and subject to punishment 
unless the violation was done with some culpable state of mind. The distinction between willful 
and accidental conduct was the earliest recognized distinction to a determination of 
culpability.84 Early evidence of recognition of this distinction appears in the Laws of Alfred over 
one thousand years ago:  
 
Let the man who slayeth another wilfully perish by death. Let him who slayeth another 
… unwillingly or unartfully, as God may have sent unto his hands, and for whom he has 
not lain in wait, be worthy of his life, and of lawful ‘bot,’ if he seek asylum. If, however, 
anyone presumptuously and wilfully slay his neighbor through guile, pluck thou him 
from my altar, to the end that he may perish by death.85 
 
 Empirical studies confirm the continuing strength of this shared intuition. In a culpability 
requirements study, subjects were given scenarios containing instances of unconsented-to 
intercourse, statutory rape, and property damage offenses involving damage to a dwelling or to 
unimproved property.86 In each scenario, the level of culpability of the person’s mistake as to 
committing the offense varied. Where the offender was faultless in the commission of the 
offense, the majority of subjects most frequently imposed no liability or no punishment.87  
 Children as young as 5 or 6 years of age similarly view wrongdoing as inherently 
different when committed unintentionally. In reviewing several studies on the intent-accident 
distinction, Rachel Karniol concludes that “children do evaluate actors who engage in 
intentional negative acts as more naughty than those who enact accidental ones that result in 
damage,” even where the children are “unable to explain the reasons for their choice of which 
character is naughtier.”88 
The absent-law cases also demonstrate a concern for imposing liability and punishment 
only where there is culpability and cognitive capacity of the offender. In the 1972 Andes plane 
crash, for example, a man named Harley was discovered to have a private stash of toothpaste, 
which typically was part of the group’s food stores (and coveted as a tasty dessert).89 At his 
“hearing” before the group it was determined that he was misled by another man, Delgado, 
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who had told him that the toothpaste was not part of the group stores and thus he could 
properly trade it to Harley. Harley’s plea, essentially one of honest mistake, was accepted and 
he was not sanctioned. 
Or take the example of the crew aboard the first pirate ship, the Charles II (rechristened 
the Fancy).90 After departing the Spanish port of A Coruna and flying a newly fashioned flag 
bearing a skull and crossbones, the mutineers made up their own laws. These outlaws deemed 
an offender’s culpable state of mind relevant to deserved punishment. In one case, three 
officers were found to have taken clothing from the common loot storage area to make 
themselves more attractive to the women in town. Stealing from the common loot was a 
serious offense normally justifying a death sentence. Upon returning to the ship, the officers 
were put on trial before the crew to answer for the theft charges. When the officers explained 
that their intention had been only to borrow the clothing for the night and not to keep, they 
were discharged with only a warning. 
The provision for a mistake defense appears to apply not only to mistake as to offense 
elements but also mistake as to the conditions that would provide a justification defense. In the 
study of justification defenses discussed previously,91 most people impose no punishment if the 
defensive force seems unavoidable to the actor. On the other hand, if the person could have 
safely retreated before using deadly force, subjects impose an average punishment of 9.6 
months.92 In comparison to 9.6 months, if the person mistakenly believes that he cannot 
retreat, then he gets no punishment.93 In other words, not only do subjects almost universally 
recognize the use of defensive force as not wrongful, they tend to be quite sympathetic and 
forgiving when a defender makes a mistake in the use of such force. 
The sense of justice held by young children also incorporates whether an offender has 
made a mistake. When children aged five and seven make judgments regarding blame, they 
take into account the fact that others might have incorrect beliefs.94 Their judgments are quite 
nuanced. If a person’s belief is different than the child’s on matters of fact—that is, beliefs 
concerning what is true (as opposed to what is morally right)—then mitigation often is 
permitted. However, if the different belief relates to what is right and wrong (for example, a 
teacher who thinks it is acceptable to discriminate against someone based on gender), then the 
person’s mistake does not exculpate him.95 This implies that children have a sophisticated 
understanding of others’ beliefs and the role they play in the commission of moral offenses. 
Further research has shown similar results in older children.96 
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2. An actor who lacks the capacity to know his conduct is wrong or to avoid 
committing it is not blameworthy 
 
 The second but related circumstance where blameworthiness is agreed to be lacking 
despite the commission of a wrongful act is where the offender through no fault of their own 
lacks sufficient capacity to understand the wrongfulness of or to control their conduct. While 
the law and the community commonly assume sanity, maturity, sobriety, and absence of 
coercion, in the unusual case, a person may suffer a disability and its effects may be such that 
he or she cannot reasonably be expected to have avoided the violation. 
 The insanity and immaturity defenses were recognized as early as the laws of Athens.97 
As explained in Book IX of Plato’s Laws in 360 B.C.E., crimes may be committed 
 
in a state of madness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme 
old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness (hybris), himself no better than a child. And if 
this be made evident to the judges elected to try the cause, on the appeal of the 
criminal or his advocate, and he be judged to have been in this state when he 
committed the offense, he shall simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to 
another; but he shall be exempt from other penalties…98 
 
 General agreement on the propriety of providing such excuse defenses is confirmed, for 
example, in many of the absent-law cases. Take the example of Michael Privitiera, a.k.a. Crazy 
Mike, an inmate in the Attica prison known to be unstable and violent.99 Privitiera had been 
hostile towards the captured guards since the first day of the Attica uprising. He was brought 
before the committee for attacking one of the hostages and assaulting an inmate in the 
process, in violation of the group’s rules that would normally result in the death penalty. The 
inmate committee found that because he suffered from mental illness or disturbance, he would 
instead be sent to D Block for temporary preventive detention.  
It may seem puzzling that in the midst of the Attica uprising chaos the committee’s 
judgments were not about punishment alone but about just punishment. But empirical studies 
confirm that extrinsic forces as well as the offender’s characteristics influence liability 
judgments that provide excuse defenses. In one study, an individual who is characterized with 
various details that suggest insanity picks up an object nearby, such as a baseball bat, a mallet, 
or a rock, and hits another person with it, killing that other person.100 The results indicate that 
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perpetrators who are judged to be suffering from a high degree of dysfunction, whether of the 
cognitive or conduct control sort, are normally not assigned criminal liability. 
 Beyond an offender’s individual dysfunctions, external pressures on an offender can also 
be seen as a defense for punishable conduct. The bank manager who lets burglars into the bank 
vault after hours because the burglars have kidnapped his family is acting under a coercive 
force that will reduce or extinguish his perceived blameworthiness. One study gave subjects 
duress scenarios with varying levels of coercion.101 Subjects generally refused to impose 
criminal liability or punishment in those scenarios in which they judged the offender as 
blameless for the offense because of the coercion.102 
 As the empirical studies show, all of these sources of dysfunction—mental illness, 
involuntary intoxication, immaturity, and duress—can undercut the blameworthiness required 
for criminal liability. Even in cases where a complete excuse is not provided, the greater the 
dysfunction, the greater the degree of mitigation, as we shall see in discussion of the 
Proportionality Principle immediately below. 
 Excuse defenses are also commonly recognized in absent-law situations. In 1822, on the 
whaling ship the Globe, one of the officers, Samuel Comstock, had signed on with the intent of 
seizing the ship, sailing off to a Pacific island, and declaring himself to be a pirate king.103 
Comstock recruited several other men, who joined him at the appointed hour in killing all the 
officers as they slept. One officer, Gilbert Smith, was not with the others, and before Comstock 
could bludgeon him to death, he pledged allegiance to Comstock if he would spare his life, 
which Comstock agreed to do. Smith thereafter managed the sailing of the ship and even 
allowed a man to be hung for a crime Smith knew the man had not committed. Yet when the 
non-mutineers in the crew later took back control of the ship from Comstock, Smith was not 
punished, apparently on the theory that he had been coerced to participate. 
 
D. The Proportionality Principle: The Extent of Liability and Punishment Should Be 
Proportionate to the Extent of Wrongdoing and Blameworthiness 
 
 Another principle that emerges from the six types of evidence is that the extent of 
liability and punishment should be proportionate to the offender’s wrongdoing and 
blameworthiness.104 This requires an assessment of the seriousness of the offense as well as 
the culpable state of mind and capacity of the offender. The indicators point to several specific 
ideas demonstrating application of the Proportionality Principle: (1) greater harm deserves 
greater punishment; (2) harm to persons is generally more wrongful than harm to property; 
and (3) criminal liability should increase with increased culpability levels and decrease with the 
reduced blameworthiness of partial excuses. 
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 1. Greater Harm Deserves Greater Punishment 
 
 One of the foundations of the Proportionality Principle is that relatively more serious 
offenses are deserving of relatively greater punishment. Support for this contention is vast. 
 Some of the most convincing evidence of the Principle’s near-universal acceptance 
comes from empirical studies, both in the United States and cross culturally. A substantial body 
of research indicates a broad consensus regarding the relative seriousness of different 
wrongdoings and the appropriate relative amount of punishment. While some people may give 
generally harsher punishment and others generally less harsh punishment, people tend to 
agree on the relative degree of blameworthiness among a set of cases. These studies confirm 
the existence of shared intuitions as to relative seriousness of different variations on 
wrongdoing. The Robinson and Kurzban study showing almost complete agreement in the rank 
ordering of 24 crime scenarios across all demographics, for instance, has already been 
discussed.105 
 One of the most well-known studies is that of Thorsten Sellin and Marvin Wolfgang, who 
in the 1960s surveyed 575 individuals across Pennsylvania about the seriousness of fifty-one 
offenses.106 The subjects were asked to both place offenses on a scale ranging from one to 
eleven, and to assign each offense a number, without any predetermined range, to indicate the 
offense’s seriousness relative to bicycle theft, which was arbitrarily assigned a value of ten. The 
results show broad agreement. The researchers conclude that “[t]he most strongly supported 
conclusion . . . is that all the raters . . . tended to assign the magnitude estimations [so] that the 
seriousness of the crimes is evaluated in a similar way, without significant differences, by all the 
groups” and, further, that a “pervasive social agreement about what is serious and what is not 
appears to emerge . . . .”107 
 Since Sellin and Wolfgang, there have been many other studies using a variety of 
methods, all reaching similar conclusions. Alfred Blumstein and Jacqueline Cohen surveyed 603 
residents of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Subjects were asked to assign the length of a 
prison sentence that “best fits the seriousness of the offense” for twenty-three offenses that 
researchers presented in the form of brief crime scenarios.108 The researchers found no strong 
effects of demographics—including gender, race, religious affiliation, or level of education—on 
the ordering of sentences. That is, different groups tended to agree on which crimes should be 
punished more than other crimes. They concluded that there was “considerable agreement 
across various demographic groups on the relative severity of the sentences to be imposed for 
different offenses.”109 
 Lee Hamilton and Steve Rytina conducted face-to-face interviews with 391 subjects in 
the Boston area in which they asked subjects to rank each of seventeen offenses using a 
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“magnitude estimation task” similar to the one described above.110 A comparison of the 
individuals’ judgments of seriousness and desired punishments with the sample’s average 
judgments gave high correlations—0.71 and 0.73, respectively—suggesting “a high level of 
consensus.”111 An analysis of the demographic differences among the subjects—age, race, 
income, and sex—showed no strong effects.112 
 Similarly, Peter Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine Bose, and Richard Berk interviewed 125 
whites and 75 blacks in Baltimore, Maryland with a roughly equal number of males and 
females, asking people to categorize 80 offenses each into nine categories according to how 
serious the offense was perceived to be.113 The correlations between ratings of blacks and 
whites, males and females, and more and less educated groups were 0.89, 0.94, and 0.89 
respectively, indicating a substantial amount of agreement.114 
 Charles Thomas, Robin Cage, and Samuel Foster surveyed 3334 households, asking 
subjects what they felt would be a “fair sentence” for each of seventeen offenses.115 They 
reported finding “evidence of a remarkable level of consensus, even after separating the 
sample on the basis of their sex, race, age, income, occupational prestige, and educational 
attainment.”116 They concluded that the findings, “regardless of the type or category of offense 
examined, are not supportive of any prediction that suggests variations between different 
categories of the population in either perceptions of relative seriousness of these offenses, or 
the level of sanctions that are viewed as appropriate.”117 
 In sum, in their review of the literature through 1997, Peter Rossi and Richard Berk 
suggest that the studies converge on the view that people share intuitions about the relative 
seriousness of wrongdoing.118 “[A] [f]airly strong consensus exists on the seriousness ordering 
of crimes, with those involving actual or threatened physical harm to victims generally 
considered to be the most serious . . . .”119 In fact, their summary of previous studies suggest 
that “there is very little, if any evidence that there exist subgroups within the American 
population with radically different views about sentencing norms,” and that “[t]here is no 
evidence for a normative order that is an alternative to what the overwhelming majority of the 
American population believe.”120 
 But these results are far from limited to the American population. Cross-cultural 
evidence supports the view that people everywhere share some intuitions about the relative 
seriousness of core wrongdoing. Included here are three studies that are representative of the 
large body of literature. 
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A comparison of O’Connell and Whelan’s data on Irish subjects with a British sample 
from a decade earlier found that, “Irish perceptions of crime . . . have much in common with 
those in other jurisdictions,” especially with regard to more serious crimes.121 
 Marlene Hsu administered a survey to 600 persons in Taiwan asking for seriousness 
judgments of 14 offenses, which were the 14 index offenses of Sellin and Wolfgang translated 
into Chinese, on an 11-point scale.122 Hsu found similar ordinal judgments in the relative 
ranking of the 14 offenses between the Taiwanese and American samples, with a coefficient of 
.84 (.95 among male subjects).123  
 Newman’s study of 2,360 individuals from a number of different cultures—India (512), 
Indonesia (500), Iran (479), Italy (200), United States (169), Yugoslavia (500)—revealed that, 
“[i]f one were to order the acts according to the proportions of each country sample 
criminalizing them, one would find a general consensus across all countries as to the extent that 
all acts should be tolerated.”124 Newman also reports that “[a]t the general level of analysis, it is 
apparent that there was considerable agreement as to the amount of punishment appropriate 
to each act” and that looking at relative rankings indicates “general agreement in ranks across 
all countries.”125 
 Studies suggest that even young children intuitively appreciate the relative seriousness 
of different kinds of wrongful conduct, distinguishing between more serious and less serious 
offenses. For example, Marie Tisak and Elliot Turiel gave children (average ages of the groups 
were roughly seven, nine, and eleven) stories about acts that violated either moral rules 
(regarding theft or hitting) or prudential rules (regarding running and falling).126 Subjects 
reported that the violation of the moral rule was more serious and that it would be less 
acceptable to change moral rules. The comparison between moral rules and prudential rules 
indicates judgments that go beyond consideration of consequences of rule-violating actions. 
 Substantial research demonstrates that the developmental sequence for moral 
reasoning is not unique to the Western world. Larry Nucci suggests that “there is considerable 
cross-cultural evidence that children and adults across a wide range of the world’s cultures 
conceptualize prototypical moral issues pertaining to fairness and others’ welfare in ways very 
similar to children and adults in Western contexts, and differentiate such issues from 
prototypical matters of convention.”127 In a recent review, Jenny Yau and Judith Smetana 
concluded that despite cultural differences, “[c]hildren as young as 3½ to 4 years of age have 
been found to treat moral transgressions as very serious, generalizably wrong, and wrong 
independent of rules and authority sanctions. In contrast, they treat conventional 
transgressions as less serious, contextually relative, and contingent on rules and authorities.”128 
 The absent-law groups also commonly set punishment according to the relative 
seriousness of the violation. The rules adopted by the pirates aboard the Fancy follow this 
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pattern of having punishment track the seriousness of the offense.129 A pirate who did not keep 
his weapons in working order or “neglected his business” would be “cut off from his share.” A 
man who endangered the ship by smoking in bed would receive “Moses law” (forty lashes). 
Because the pirates continued in their present dangerous and burdensome occupation for the 
purpose of gaining wealth, one of the most serious offenses was stealing from the group, which 
was punished by marooning on an uninhabited island, essentially a death sentence. 
 In addition to demonstrating the need for just punishment, absent-law situations also 
shed light on human abhorrence of injustice—or imposing greater punishment than is 
deserved. In 1629, the sailing ship Batavia wrecked on a coral reef off the coast of wild and 
unknown western Australia on its journey from Amsterdam to the spice ports of Java.130 The 
strip of coral rubble, about five hundred yards long, on which the nearly three hundred people 
aboard were caught, was home only to seabirds and sea lions. The captain and crew took stock 
of the situation, and it became clear to everyone that no help would be coming.  
 In keeping with the policy of the Dutch East India Company, as ranking officer, 
Jeronimus Cornelisz was elected head of a committee, called the Raad, that ran the affairs of 
the sudden community. His exercise of authority brought order to the group, as tasks were 
assigned and resources rationed, but his autocratic style was perceived as producing unjust 
rules and punishment. In one of the first disciplinary cases to come before the Raad, a man had 
stolen food from the common stores and shared it with another man. He was convicted before 
the Raad, and Cornelisz insisted that both men be killed. The committee objected that the 
punishment was too severe, especially with regard to the man who had only shared in the food. 
The harsh sentences may well have provided the intimidation that Cornelisz sought, but they 
also hurt his reputation and added to the population’s increasing doubts about his fairness and 
judgment. 
 If people were indifferent to notions of fairness and justice, the smart move would have 
been to sign on at the start as an enthusiastic supporter of Cornelisz, who had a monopoly on 
the existing resources and power. But, even then, most of the few hundred people on the 
island were put off by the injustice of Cornelisz’s punishments and his unfairness in dealing with 
some situations. Most refused to join his governing group, even though by doing so they could 
have made their lives more tolerable and their long-term survival more likely. Indeed, the 
majority of the survivors eventually abandoned Cornelisz and his resources to take up a bleaker 
existence on a nearby island where the primary draw was the group’s promise of just rules and 
punishments. 
 
  2. Harm to persons is generally more wrongful than harm to property 
 
 Empirical studies have consistently demonstrated that people view harm to persons to 
be more serious, and deserving of greater punishment, than harm to property. In his review of 
the four decades of literature on perceptions of seriousness following Sellin and Wolfgang, 
Setlios Stylianou concluded that “relative consensus seems to exist cross-culturally with respect 
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to behaviors that are generally ranked high on the seriousness scale. … These offenses are 
typically those involving bodily injury, followed by those causing property damage or loss.”131  
 In the Rossi, Waite, Bose, and Berk study in Baltimore discussed previously, the 
researchers concluded that “[c]rimes against persons, especially murder, receive very high 
seriousness ratings. Crimes against property in which no action is taken against people are 
rated significantly lower,” but still greater than “offenses often classified as misdemeanors, e.g., 
‘disturbing the peace,’ or ‘being drunk in public places.’”132 
 This intuition is not limited to adult populations. In a study performed by David Elkind 
and Ruth Dabek, children were divided into groups based on age (average ages of the groups 
were roughly five-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and nine).133 The children listened to stories 
about different crimes which varied in terms of whether the harm was to a person or to 
property. The children then assessed blame and were asked about punishment. On average, 
the children viewed damage to a person as more serious. These results are mirrored in later 
work that suggests that while very young children focus on either intention or harm, older 
children (age four and five) use both harm and intention when making decisions about 
punishment.134 Such conclusions strongly imply that children have sophisticated views on 
desert and possess the ability to weigh multiple factors by age seven.135 
 Findings also indicate that “children consider moral transgressions resulting in physical 
harm to be more wrong than moral transgressions resulting in property violations.”136 This 
suggests that children have complex intuitions across different domains. Additional evidence 
comes from studies in which children are asked to give examples of moral transgressions. 
Children give physical acts of harm as the most common examples. Acts of physical aggression 
are “prototypical” moral violations to children. 
 The principle that harm to persons is more wrongful than harm to property can also be 
ascertained by studying the degrees of punishment doled out by absent-law groups. For 
instance, the San Francisco Vigilance Committee, which, as discussed previously, sought to 
achieve just punishment, would hang murderers but only banish robbers.137 
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3. Criminal liability should increase with increased culpability level and decrease with 
the reduced blameworthiness of partial excuses 
 
 The third dimension of the Proportionality Principle involves taking account of an 
offender’s culpability and capacity when determining criminal liability. Culpability elements of 
offenses serve two distinct functions: defining the minimum requirements for liability and 
distinguishing different grades of a single offense. Where an offender commits an offense with 
relatively greater culpability—say, purposefully or knowingly—they deserve greater 
punishment. Where an offender acts with lesser culpability, such as when acting recklessly or 
negligently, they are less blameworthy and deserve correspondingly less punishment (or none 
at all). 
 The idea that an offender’s liability and punishment ought to reflect the offender’s 
degree of culpability is an old one. Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient Greek philosophers and 
jurists distinguished between hekousios (intentional) and akousios (unintentional) offenses.138 
The modern theory of mens rea itself can be traced as far back as Roman and Anglo-Saxon law 
from the fifth century.139 
 Empirical studies confirm ordinary people tend to vary liability and punishment with the 
level of culpability. In one study, John Darley and I sought to determine the community’s views 
of the appropriate level of culpability that should be required for various kinds of elements of 
different kinds of offenses.140 Subjects were given six base scenarios: mistake as to causing 
damage to a house, mistake as to causing damage to unimproved property, mistake as to 
ownership of the house damaged, mistake as to ownership of the unimproved property 
damaged, mistake as to lack of consent to intercourse, mistake as to age of the underage 
partner. In each scenario, the level of culpability of the person’s mistake varied among 
knowledge, recklessness, negligence, and faultlessness. Subjects perceived the four variations 
of each scenario as presenting distinguishable cases, where liability and punishment ought to 
increase as the manipulated level of culpability increases. Cross-cultural studies confirm the 
same view that people see offenses as more serious when done intentionally rather than 
accidentally.141 
 Studies also show that children similarly view offenses differently when committed with 
mitigating circumstances. In one study, John Darley, Ellen Klosson, and Mark Zanna presented 
subjects, including first graders and fourth graders, vignettes in which one child harmed 
another. Half the subjects also received information depicting either necessity, public duty, or 
provocation, whereas the other half were presented no such mitigating circumstances. The 
researchers found that across the entire age range “each mitigating circumstance led to less 
recommended punishment for the harm-doing act.”142 
 In another study, David Bersoff and Joan Miller presented third graders, seventh 
graders, and college-age adults vignettes depicting offenses such as harm to persons or damage 
to another’s property together with potentially extenuating circumstances: absence of control, 
 
138 L. A. Zaibert, Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A Historical-Philosophical Analysis, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 459, 463-66 (1998). 
139 Albert Levitt, Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. R. 117 (1922-1923). 
140 PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 302-10 (2013). 
141 PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 27 (2013). 
142 Darley, Klosson & Zanna, Intentions and Their Contexts in the Moral Judgments of Children and Adults, 49 CHILD 




emotional duress, or immaturity.143 Across age groups, the subjects tended to treat actors as 
not accountable for accidental behaviors, and frequently absolved them of accountability in 
cases involving absence of control and emotional duress.144 The researchers concluded that “it 
appears likely that the common developmental trend observed in the case of the anger duress 
breaches reflects certain early features of young children’s conceptions of anger-based revenge 
as well as certain shared cultural views concerning the disruptive interpersonal consequences 
of such action.”145 
The principle of blameworthiness proportionality applies not only to varying punishment 
according to level of culpability but also to varying punishment according to level of cognitive or 
control incapacity. Thus, even where an offender may not get a complete excuse defense for 
immaturity, involuntary intoxication, insanity, duress or any other excusing condition, subjects 
typically would provide reduced liability and punishment to the extent that such incapacity 
reduces the offender’s blameworthiness for the offense.  
For example, to examine community views on an immaturity defense, study subjects 
were given scenarios where the offender’s age varied, from ten to fourteen to eighteen years, 
compared against a control case of an adult perpetrator.146 The results showed that the 
younger the perpetrator, the less the punishment. An adult gets on average a split between life 
imprisonment and the death penalty for intentionally setting a boy on fire to kill him while he 
sleeps. In contrast, an eighteen-year-old gets an average punishment of 25.5 years for the same 
offense; a fourteen-year-old 6.2 years; and a ten-year-old 11 months. Rossi, Simpson, and 
Miller similarly found that punishments varied according to not only the consequences of the 
crime, but also features of the victims and offenders.147  
 To examine community views on the effect of involuntary intoxication, one study gave 
subjects five homicide scenarios where the offender suffered from the following dysfunctions: 
high cognitive only, low cognitive only, high control only, low control only, and low cognitive 
plus low control.148 Respondents were told that the cause of the involuntary intoxication is an 
unexpected interaction between two medications that the person is taking: a medication to 
control long-term pain and a medication described as an over-the-counter drug for treatment 
of a cold. The prescribing physician had not mentioned the possibility of drug interaction side 
effects, and the person had not thought to ask about them. The results show that people do 
assess cases of involuntary intoxication in terms of the degree of dysfunction that they bring 
about, and those perceptions of the dysfunctions cause them to reduce the liability they assign 
to the person.149 However, the respondents are noticeably less willing to treat involuntary 
intoxication as a complete defense; it mitigates liabilities but the liabilities assigned are still 
significant.150 
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 Another study gave subjects duress scenarios with varying levels of coercion.151 The core 
scenario involved an individual who agrees to transport eight ounces of cocaine for another. 
The respondents were asked to indicate the amount of coercion they saw exercised on the 
person; whether a person of reasonable firmness would be coerced or induced to commit the 
offense; and the degree of impropriety of the inducements that are held out to the person in 
committing the crime, as well as an assessment of the punishment that the person deserves, if 
any. In the control case in which the person commits the crime—transporting cocaine—with no 
degree of duress or inducement, the liability imposed is approximately two years. In the high 
coercion case, an individual with no prior record transports the cocaine for an individual who 
threatens to kill his family if he does not do so. The high-coercion caused liability results that 
are much lower than the control case, a sentence of just 3.8 weeks on average, suggesting that 
the respondents see a considerable mitigation. Also, 50% of the subjects assigned no 
punishment to the offender at all. As the degree of coercion decreases, the subjects produce a 
liability result that is between that of the high coercion and no coercion cases.152  
 The blameworthiness proportionality principle also appears in natural experiments of 
groups caught in situations of lawlessness. For example, in the California mining camps claims 
were marked by leaving tools as markers.153 The standard penalty for taking the tools and 
thereby subverting the claim was death. In one instance, however, an Irishman and a Dutchman 
took some old tools thinking that they were in such bad shape that they were probably 
abandoned. Their lack of care and attention that led them to make this mistake—the tools 
were not abandoned and really were marking a claim—let them escape the death penalty but 
their culpability for the mistake justified some lesser punishment, so they were expelled from 
the camp, thereby losing their own claim.154 
 
E. Constructing a Criminal Code 
 
 Here then are nine core principles that the evidence suggests have near universal appeal 
across demographics, cultures, and history, and whose expression we see in the universal path 
of child development, behavior revealed by animal studies, and a wide range of natural 
experiments of groups caught beyond the reach of law and society. The nine principles do not 
necessarily provide an exhaustive list. One could argue for the recognition of other core 
principles that would further fill out the meaning of wrongdoing,155 the reach of the 
blameworthiness core principle,156 or the demands of the proportionality principle.157 But I will 
leave it to others to determine what additional core principles might exist. Nor are the core 
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principles provided here stated in as detailed a form as might be possible. Future research and 
analysis by others may well allow for greater specificity.   
 These principles are not themselves a criminal code but rather provide the foundation 
for drafting the core of a criminal code. Thus, for example, the obvious principle that 
“wrongdoing includes physical aggression” calls for the criminalization of the use of force. In 
codifying that criminalization, the principle that “greater harm deserves greater punishment” 
suggests codifying different offenses of increasing seriousness—of increasing “offense grades” 
in modern codes—as the harm increases, thus distinguishing assault, aggravated assault, and 
homicide, for example. And societies may come to recognize other aspects of physical 
aggression that they conceive of as additional harms, such as whether a gun was used (thereby 
creating greater risks). The principle that “an actor with no culpable state of mind as to the 
offense is not blameworthy” calls for a minimum culpability, of negligence or recklessness, for 
example, to impose criminal liability for any of these assault offenses. The principle that 
“criminal liability should increase with increased culpability level” suggests that each assault 
offense be graded more seriously when done intentionally than when done recklessly. A similar 
analytic process would guide the creation of other offenses suggested by the core principles.  
 Of course, the core principles do not provide a complete criminal code for a modern 
society. Every criminal code should embody the offenses and defenses suggested by these core 
principles. However, depending on the society, additional provisions, especially relating to the 
definition of wrongdoing, will be required to deal with wrongdoing out from the core. A society 
with a well-developed commercial and governmental structure will want to add offenses such 
as bribery and corruption, for example. Technologically developed societies will want to add 
cybercrime offenses. Societies with migration patterns that leave citizens living among 
nonfamily members may want to create privacy offenses.  
 Some of these non-core offenses might well be affected by the extent to which they are 
seen as analogous to core harms—some corruption offenses may seem very much like the core 
wrongdoing of theft, for example—but each society will need to decide for itself, based on its 
particular situation, on the proper formulation and punishment of non-core offenses. But 
whatever norms it recognizes, many of the core principles will influence the criminal code 
formulation, such as those principles concerning minimum culpability requirements, minimum 
cognitive and control and control functioning (excuse defenses), and blameworthiness 
proportionality requirements relating to culpability requirements greater than the minimum 
and to instances of partial excuse. 
 
IV. Speculations on the Reasons for the Existence of the Core 
 
 The strong support for the existence of near universal principles of criminal liability and 
punishment, even across demographics, cultures, and era, as described in Part III, presents an 
intriguing puzzle: How can it be that people with such varied situations and backgrounds agree 
on issues that seem so subjective and complex? 
 As discussed in depth in The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice,158 the theory of 
evolution offers one possible explanation. Human success as a species came in large part from 
their sociability—their ability to work together in a group. This success was possible only with 
 





group cohesion and cooperation. And this group cooperation depended upon the group 
accepting a set of rules that protected the group members, which probably meant agreed-upon 
prohibitions against physical violence, taking property without consent, and deceit in 
exchanges. But enforcement of these rules could only be undertaken by physical violence or 
taking property of the offender (or denying him property that he would normally be entitled 
to). Thus, to enforce the rules required to maintain group cooperation, the group had to not 
only agree upon some basic conduct rules but also agree upon what constituted an appropriate 
amount of punishment for particular violation. Dramatically over punishing or under punishing 
would tend to undermine the conditions required for continued cooperative action. 
 To summarize, if enforcement of the essential norms was not to trigger further 
violations, setting off a downward spiral into chaos, humans had to share some common 
understanding of what kind of punishment was appropriate for what kind of violation and to 
mark this out as not itself a violation of the group norms but rather as vindication and 
reinforcement of them. In other words, there was an enormous evolutionary advantage, indeed 
a necessity for survival, to humans sharing a view that punishing serious wrongdoing was 
necessary and not itself a new violation, and also a general sense of the relative seriousness of 
different wrongs to guide the amount of appropriate punishment. 
 It has been shown both theoretically and empirically that cooperation can evolve 
through several independent but overlapping processes. The one most relevant for the 
immediate purpose concerns the mutually beneficial effects of reciprocity: if you share with me 
today in exchange for my sharing with you yesterday, we are both better off than if neither of 
us share. In social animals, reciprocity can involve such things as alerting other group members 
when food has been discovered, sharing food over time, and supporting a comrade in action 
against others. 
 But underlying this rosy picture is a darker shadow. While it is evident that reciprocators 
can outperform loners, a cheater—or a free-rider—could theoretically outperform both if he 
were able to regularly take benefits without repaying them. Consequently, an evolutionary 
arms race ensues in social animals between various predispositions toward cooperation and 
exploitation. In the end, the most successful cooperators are not those who always cooperate, 
but rather those who cooperate selectively with other cooperators, thus discriminating 
(passively or aggressively) against those who are not reliable partners in cooperative endeavors. 
Put another way, effective cooperation requires rewarding good behavior and punishing bad 
behavior. 
 Humans have a universal and uniquely nuanced propensity for engaging in social 
exchange. Indeed, gains from social exchange form the basis of the modern economy and 
infiltrate nearly every aspect of life, both in formal markets and in personal relationships. The 
psychology that underpins exchange requires deep intuitions and complex computational 
capacities to operate. 
 In particular, one critical capacity for successful social exchange is the intuition that one 
should punish individuals who injure others or cheat in an exchange. If one is engaged in 
transactions with the same person over time, then allowing another individual to injure or to 
cheat without punishment is an invitation to exploitation without end. Therefore, to be most 
successful in social exchange, one must have the capacity not only to detect but also to punish 
such persons. 
 This implies that there might have been selection in humans for the cognitive 




yield intuitions that motivate the punishment of people who violate the most ancient and 
fundamentally necessary principles of social exchange. In other words, the evolutionary history 
of social exchange has likely led to the development of a reliable psychological system that is 
able to compute when someone has injured or cheated, as well as to a motivation to punish 
them. 
 This hypothesis, that shared intuitions of justice derive in large measure from the 
relentless effects of evolutionary processes on human brains and consequent sentiments and 
behavioral predispositions, connects at a deep level with modern developments in biology and 
psychology. It also appears to explain why these intuitions appear to be so stunningly 
consistent across our species, so subtle in their complexities, and so non-randomly focused on 
the harms to which their attention is particularly keen. Three different areas of research 
provide data that are consistent with this hypothesis: animal studies,159 brain science,160 and 
child development.161 
 While no single study or field of research conclusively proves the evolutionary 
hypothesis for the origins of shared intuitions of justice, the triangulation of the theoretical 
foundations from biology and psychology generally, alongside behavioral data in humans and 
other species, recent studies of human brain operations, and broad research into the 
characteristically human development of moral psychology, presents a strong case. 
 
V. Implications of the Existence of Core Principles 
 
 Whether one finds the speculation of the previous Part persuasive, it ought not affect 
one’s conclusions about the existence of the core principles or of their importance. One might 
be tempted to consider the core principles described in Part III as an interesting academic 
exercise. But as this Part makes clear, their existence has a wide variety of important real-world 
implications. Below are ten examples of significant implications of the principles’ existence, 
implications on a wide variety of fronts, including increasing effective crime-control, limitations 
and strategies for effective social reform, the use of restorative justice, doctrinal reform 
proposals involving the legality principle, mistake of law excuses, and the recognition of partial 
excuses as a mitigation, as well as implications for such diverse big issue topics as the feasibility 
of having an international criminal law, creating a criminal code for an as yet nonexistent 
population, and even setting a strategy for meeting extraterrestrials. 
 
A. Credibility Costs in Conflicting with the Core 
 
 Existing research suggests that a criminal justice system derives practical value by 
distributing criminal liability and punishment according to principles that track societal 
intuitions of justice.162 Specifically, perceptions of substantive justice—resulting in perceptions 
of the system’s “moral credibility”—promote compliance, cooperation, deference, and 
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internalization of the law’s norms. By contrast, a criminal justice system perceived to be 
substantively unjust can provoke resistance and subversion, and may lose its capacity to 
harness powerful social and normative influence. Subversion and resistance may take the form 
of either an impulse toward apathy or an impulse toward self-help. That is, people may turn to 
vigilantism in reaction to a perceived failure of justice. More commonly, people may resist or 
subvert the system in less dramatic ways. Citizens may fail to report crimes in the first instance. 
Witnesses may lose an incentive to offer their information or testimony. Jurors may disregard 
their jury instructions. Police officers, prosecutors, and judges may make up their own rules. 
And offenders may resist adjudication processes and punishments rather than participate in 
them.  
 Studies confirm that laypeople think of criminal liability and punishment in terms of 
desert—the moral blameworthiness of the offender—and not in terms of other principles, such 
as general deterrence and incapacitation, which have been so popular with system designers 
during the past several decades.163 Thus, people naturally expect that a criminal justice system 
will distribute criminal liability and punishment so as to do justice. If the criminal law earns a 
reputation as a reliable statement of what the community perceives as condemnable, people 
are more likely to defer to its commands as morally authoritative in those borderline cases in 
which the propriety of certain conduct is unsettled or ambiguous in the mind of the actor. Such 
deference will be facilitated if citizens are disposed to believe that the law is an accurate guide 
to what society sees as appropriate prudential and moral behavior. 
 Recent research has shown that even minor changes in moral credibility incrementally 
affect people’s willingness to acquiesce, assist, and defer to the criminal law.164 One technique 
used in social science research on such issues is an experiment in which subjects are told of 
injustices in the current criminal justice system that they did not previously know about and are 
then tested to see whether the new information changes their view of the system and their 
willingness to assist and defer to it. 
 These studies have shown that subjects exposed to unjust cases are less willing to assist 
and defer. Subjects who perceived failures in the criminal justice system were significantly less 
likely to say they would defer to the system’s rules in the future. Their willingness to obey 
correlated with the degree to which they judged that law to be morally valid. And exposure to 
outcomes that are inconsistent with their shared intuitions of justice increased the likelihood of 
future noncompliance.165  
 Unfortunately, studies have shown that current liability and punishment rules 
commonly undermine the criminal law’s reputation for doing justice. One recent study showed 
that a wide range of modern crime-control doctrines treat cases in ways that dramatically 
conflict with laypeople’s intuitions of justice.166 The conflict exists for such standard doctrines 
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as “three strikes” and other habitual offender statutes, high penalties for drug offenses, adult 
prosecution of juveniles, abolition or narrowing of the insanity defense, strict liability, felony 
murder, and criminalization of regulatory violations. The conflicts were shown to undermine 
the criminal law’s moral credibility with the subjects. Previous and subsequent studies had 
results consistent with those results.167 What the above arguments suggest is that the criminal 
law’s long-term crime-control effectiveness will be hurt by rules that conflict with the 
community’s intuitions of justice. Yet, empirical studies make clear that current criminal law 
regularly deviates from the community’s justice judgments on a wide range of criminal law 
subjects.168  
  Importantly, the moral credibility crime-control project for its part does not actually 
demand that substantive rules produce “just” results, in a transcendent sense, only that they 
reflect people’s shared moral intuitions. The larger point here is not that shared intuitions of 
justice must always be followed, but rather that, where they are not followed and where the 
criminal law’s moral credibility suffers, there can be a cost to crime-control effectiveness that 
ought to be taken into account. A system should not distribute liability or punishment in ways 
inconsistent with empirical desert unless there is a clear justification for doing so. Empirical 
desert ought to be the distributive default; it ought not be ignored, as it commonly is today.169 
 The risks to criminal law’s moral credibility with the community are likely to be 
especially high where the criminal law conflicts with the core principles outlined in Part III. 
Given that the nine core principles are near universal in their appeal and foundational in status, 
a criminal law that breaches them is likely to suffer the consequences: resistance and 
subversion, vigilante action where the system fails to do justice, disrupting the criminal law’s 
power of stigmatization, losing compliance in borderline cases, and undermining a social 
consensus on what is and is not condemnable. 
 
B. Social Reform Limitations: Immutability and the Abolitionist Movement 
 
 Whatever one concludes from the analysis in Part IV—whether the striking existence of 
widely shared intuitions of justice is the result of evolutionary pressures or is the result of some 
other phenomena such as universal social learning—it is clear that such intuitions about the 
core of wrongdoing are so deeply ingrained in humans that they are immune from the powerful 
forces of life experience and demographics. If this were not the case, one would not find the 
high degree of agreement across demographics demonstrated in the studies or the other 
indicia of universality. 
 Thus, the existence of core principles has important implications for social reformers. 
Given the deep-seated nature of core principles, it seems unlikely that social reformers can 
successfully “educate” people out of them, at least not by methods that a liberal democracy 
would tolerate. One might speculate that extreme coercive indoctrination might have at least a 
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temporary effect,170 but only highly dictatorial nations with little regard for individual rights 
would tolerate such practices. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to bring 
persons to intuit acts that do direct harm to others as not being morally wrong. The closer an 
intuitive justice judgment is to a core principle, the more likely it is to be resistant to change.  
 Modern abolitionist movements provide another insightful example. Much of the focus 
today is on reforming the type of punishment imposed by the criminal justice system—doing 
away with the death penalty171 and prisons.172 However, some go further and promote the 
abolition of punishment altogether. David Garland argues a society that “intends to promote 
disciplined conduct and social control will concentrate not upon punishing offenders but upon 
socializing and integrating young citizens—a work of social justice and moral education rather 
than penal policy.”173 
 At its core, this proposal argues that we should look for reparation, restoration, and 
reconciliation, not for retribution and punishment (“pain-delivery”); instead of inflicting penal 
pain on wrongdoers, we should seek negotiated reparations for those who have been harmed, 
the restoration of relationships between the parties to conflicts, and their reconciliation with 
each other and with the community. 
 This is not a proposal that societies will or should adopt, for two reasons. First, as 
shown, a large majority of individuals in society would strenuously resist the abolition of 
punishment because the impulse to punish serious wrongdoing is deeply ingrained. Second, 
having punishment available to administer to norm violators greatly reduces the frequency of 
norm violations that occur.174 This Article does not assert that the lengthy prison terms that the 
criminal justice system currently imposes on offenders, coupled with the “prisonization” that is 
inflicted on offenders in prisons, is necessary to reduce the frequency of criminal violations that 
exist in our society. But it does argue that the absence of any punishment mechanisms in a 
society would lead to a set of violations sufficient to threaten the existence of the society. 
 Here, it is worth recalling the “no-punishment” experiments described previously.175 
Drop City was a commune in 1960s Colorado which “opposed external authority, power, and 
coercion in favor of voluntary cooperation and self-imposed restraints.” Any action designed to 
collectively coerce individual behavior, including punishment, violated the commune’s 
philosophy of permitting “unrestricted individuality.” However, once the commune members 
had enough of free-riding members like Peter Rabbit taking advantage and were left without 
recourse, the founders abandoned Drop City and the commune collapsed. 
 Black Bear Ranch in Siskiwou County, California was another no-punishment commune 
that seemed headed for a similar fate. But after a series of fights, outbreaks of hepatitis, and a 
growing proportion of freeloaders, formal rules were adopted and enforced by required 
appearances before the community for open discussion. If the coercion of social stigmatization 
was ineffective, the offending member was expelled. Black Bear commune’s adoption of a 
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coercive enforcement system saved it, and it continues to exist today. All no-punishment 
communes, like Drop City, have failed. 
 To conclude, even if one were convinced intellectually that abolition of punishment was 
a desirable ideal, it is a reform that could never be successfully implemented, and it would be 
folly to try to do so. We must face the reality that human beings will demand justice for serious 
wrongdoing, and that the absence of a system that allows for the imposition of deserved 
punishment would produce intolerable consequences, such as people undertaking to do justice 
themselves. 
 
C. Social Reform Strategies: Manipulating the Strength of the Analogy to the Core 
 
 The previous section introduced why efforts directed towards changing people’s views 
on matters that are immutable are destined to fail. Nevertheless, as one moves out from the 
core, society’s views on an issue may be more malleable. If a judgment of justice is of a sort that 
can be meaningfully altered, a potentially effective method of bringing about such change could 
be by manipulating the analogy to a core principle. In other words, the existence of non-
malleable core principles may make them beyond the reach of social reformers, but their 
existence can be used by social reformers who appreciate their power.  
 It is possible through public education both to inform people about negative effects of 
conduct that had not previously been fully appreciated and to analogize the conduct sought to 
be condemned with conduct that is already seen as condemnable. This approach changes 
judgments of what constitutes wrongdoing not by fighting the existing intuition but by 
harnessing it, by demonstrating that the conduct at issue really does have the condemnable 
character or effect that people’s intuitions abhor. The stronger the analogy that can be made to 
a core principle, the more pronounced the effect of education will be.  
 Two examples illustrate how judgments of justice can be successfully changed by such a 
public education campaign. For both drunk driving and cigarette smoking in banned areas, 
which have been either criminalized or given more severe penalties in recent years, 
criminalization was “successful” in that the community came to think of the actions as 
appropriately condemnable and properly criminalized. 
 For drunk driving, the path to criminalization involved changing the identity of the 
“victim” of drunk driving from the driver himself to the innocent bystander injured by the 
driver’s actions. In other words, the social reformers built up the strength of the analogy 
between drunk driving and the core principle that seriously punishes physical violence. Groups 
such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), formed of mothers who had children killed or 
injured by drunk drivers, who were tragically motivated to make drunk driving criminal, 
educated the public as to why it was that these actions fit the “moral wrong” prototype.176 
Holding up childhood or graduation pictures of their dead children, or photographs of the 
horrible results of car accidents caused by drunk drivers, they provided a persuasive message 
that drunk driving was indeed conduct highly dangerous to others. 
 Cigarette smoking was a bit of a more complicated case, but similar in that it worked by 
building an analogy to condemnable physical aggression. Initially, as evidence began to 
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accumulate that cigarettes had remarkably harmful effects on smokers and that they were for, 
at least some people, highly addictive, cigarette sales were prohibited to minors. This was 
justified on the basis that smoking was seen as creating risks for the smoker, but conventional 
wisdom coded these as risks that adult persons could not be stopped from choosing to take, 
since they were risks only to themselves. 
 As the public became educated on the potential harm caused by “secondhand smoke”—
smoke inhaled by (innocent) bystanders who were in rooms filled with smoke—people came to 
see that smokers inflicted real harm on other, nonconsenting people. That is when laws were 
passed to prohibit the infliction of these harms by banning smoking outright in public and 
private spaces where smokers and nonsmokers congregated. The rate at which the 
“immoralization” of smoking has spread through society is remarkable—fueled by the ability of 
antismoking advocates to demonstrate the harmful effects of smoking on discreet categories of 
nonsmokers. 
 The ability to replicate the results of these two public education campaigns in order to 
change judgments on other actions relies on the ability to analogize a given action to a clearly 
condemnable harm suffered by another person or group of people. The easier it is to analogize 
a desired attitude to one of the core principles, the easier it will be to gain society’s acceptance. 
The more we see downloading music without a license as akin to taking the property of another 
without consent, the more condemnable such conduct becomes. 
 The current effort to change judgments concerning “insider trading” is an example of 
both the possibilities of and the limitations on changing intuitions. Insider trading—buying and 
selling stocks or bonds based on information that a person has that is not yet known to the 
public—has been criminalized. However, despite high-profile prosecutions for violations, public 
judgments of the criminality of insider trading remain somewhat complex. 
 As predicted by the preceding argument, when the action of insider trading results in 
the selling of a stock shortly prior to the price of the stock falling, it is easier for the public to 
view this as intuitively criminal. This occurs because a “victim” can be established in the 
subsequent purchasers who suffer personal or institutional economic harm. Hence, in the case 
of the collapse of Enron, a great deal of attention was paid to the fact that many employees 
had their retirement savings invested in the company.177 
 In the opposite situation, buying stock on insider information prior to it gaining value, it 
is more difficult to identify a victim class and thus more difficult to change judgments on the 
condemnability of such action. This form of insider trading is some distance away from what is 
generally considered a core prohibition, in which one person harms another. The action harms 
all other, later buyers of the stock, because the buying actions of those who bought on insider 
information slightly raised the price of the stock at which the later buyers bought in. These later 
buyers constitute a disperse and non-personified class of actors who are harmed in some fairly 
abstract ways. Given this, it could be predicted that having people see this version of insider 
trading as truly condemnable would be somewhat more difficult than with selling a stock just 
before its price falling. 
 
 





D. An Argument for the Broader Use of Restorative Justice 
 
 The existence of these core principles of criminal law also suggests that we as a society 
should be more receptive to the use of restorative justice processes in addressing wrongdoing, 
so long as such processes are actually used in ways consistent with doing justice. Some of the 
most common practices of restorative justice are victim-offender mediation, sentencing circles, 
and family-group conferences. As long as the group is large enough to avoid idiosyncratic 
decisions, there are good reasons to rely on restorative processes more than we do today. 
 Restorative processes have many virtues. They can advance several crime control 
mechanisms at the same time—rehabilitation, deterrence, and norm reinforcement—while 
also providing restitution to the victim and putting a human face on the offender, thereby 
reducing the victim’s generalized fear of victimization and perhaps giving the victim some 
appreciation of how the circumstances may have brought the offender to commit the offense. 
 Empirical studies have shown that these virtues of restorative processes are not merely 
theoretical. After reviewing the studies, William Nugent and his colleagues have reported a nine 
percent reduction in recidivism.178 Barton Poulson found that restorative processes also make 
people feel better about the adjudication system—feeling that it is more fair and more likely to 
give an appropriate sanction.179 Ultimately, the ability of restorative processes to build the 
criminal law’s moral credibility and legitimacy can give the law a greater ability to gain 
compliance. 
 Some opponents have criticized restorative justice as being anti-punishment and 
suitable only for use with juvenile offenders and petty offenses by adults. This view may be 
understandable given the anti-punishment goals of those like John Braithwaite, who originally 
pressed restorative justice.180 Braithwaite and others make clear that they conceive of 
restorative processes not simply as a potentially useful piece of, or complement to, the criminal 
justice system, but as a substitute for it.181 Further, their version of restorative justice would 
ban all “punishment,” by which is meant, apparently, banning all punishment based on just 
deserts and instead embracing forgiveness and reintegration. 
 But the existence of the core principles, intuitively shared by the vast majority of 
humans, ought to give us greater confidence in restorative processes, at least those that involve 
“sentencing circles” or other group decision-making systems large enough to embody 
community views. In other words, we can reasonably expect that restorative justice 
dispositions will reflect the justice intuitions of the larger community and if the process is 
properly constructed, need not worry about unjust outcomes.  
 As discussed earlier, the method of punishment is not a core principle. One could 
impose the deserved punishment through any variety of alternative methods without 
undercutting justice—fine, community service, house arrest, curfew, regular reporting, diary 
keeping, or even good-faith participation in the restorative meetings itself—as long as the total 
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punitive “bite” of the disposition satisfies the total punishment the offender deserves, no more, 
no less. Furthermore, it is perfectly consistent with assessing an offender’s blameworthiness to 
factor in genuine remorse, public acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and sincere apology, and, 
thereby, determine the amount of punishment deserved. 
 Still, restorative processes can be problematic where the decision-making group is too 
small or too unrepresentative to embody the views of the community, or where the victim is 
compelled to agree to an unjust result because of an improper process. In such circumstances, 
these processes may systematically conflict with doing justice by giving more punishment, or 
less punishment, than an offender’s wrongdoing deserves. 
 Consider the 1998 New Zealand case of Patrick Clotworthy, who inflicted six stab 
wounds upon an attempted robbery victim, which collapsed a lung and diaphragm and left the 
victim badly disfigured.182 At a restorative conference organized by Justice Alternatives, it was 
agreed that Clotworthy would not go to prison; instead, he would work to earn money to pay 
the $15,000 needed for the surgical operation to diminish the victim’s disfigurement.  
 Requiring the offender to pay the victim $15,000 for the needed surgery seems entirely 
appropriate, but such a sanction hardly reflects the extent of the punishment the offender 
deserves for so vicious an attack. In fact, it does not resemble punishment for a criminal act at 
all, but rather resembles restitution under civil law. Indeed, many would see the restorative 
conference as a second victimization—a desperate victim must agree to forgo justice in order 
to rid himself of the disfiguring scar the offender caused. 
 But how we deal with offenders like Clotworthy is not merely a private affair between 
the immediate victims and offenders. There are important societal interests at stake, which is 
why we treat criminal cases as state prosecutions and not civil trials. The opposition of 
Braithwaite and others to doing justice is unfortunate because it inevitably produces both 
political and public resistance. 
 Restorative processes, such as victim-offender mediation and sentencing circles, are 
wonderful procedures that should be used much more widely than they are today. First, a good 
many restorative inflictions, such as hours of service to the victim, have punitive elements. 
Second, there is no barrier to sincere attempts to restore comity between offender and victim 
and between offender and society taking place in criminal proceedings. For offenses in which 
intuitions of justice demand retributional impositions, however, people will see justice as 
demanding those impositions. Through proper and representative processes, we can put to 
work the many virtues of restorative justice practices while also meeting the demands of 
society. 
 
E. Doctrinal Reform: More Nuanced Application of the Legality Principle 
 
 The extent of its commitment to the legality principle sets the United States apart from 
much of the rest of the world, although the larger arc of history shows most countries moving 
in the direction of greater legality.  
 The “legality principle” is really an umbrella concept for a collection of doctrines, some 
constitutional, some statutory, and some judge made. In its original Latin dress, the legality 
principle was expressed as “nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege,” meaning roughly 
“no crime without law, nor punishment without law.” In its modern form it means that criminal 
 




liability and punishment can be based only upon a prior legislative enactment of a prohibition 
that is expressed with adequate precision and clarity. The legality principle is embodied in a 
series of legal doctrines, including the abolition of common law penal doctrines,183 the 
prohibition of judicial creation of penal rules,184 special rules for the interpretation of penal 
statutes,185 the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto penal laws,186 the bar to retroactive 
application of judicial interpretations altering penal rules,187 and the due process vagueness 
prohibition.188 The benefits of the legality principle are clear. Together, these doctrines further 
the societal interests in providing fair notice; increasing compliance, such as through deterrent 
effect; reserving criminalization decisions to the legislature; increasing uniformity in the 
treatment of similar cases; and reducing the potential for the abuse of discretion. 
 As I have argued before,189 there are in fact two kinds of legality: When applied to the 
criminal law rules that announce ex ante rules of conduct, the principle promotes the virtues of 
fair notice and gaining compliance. When applied to the criminal law rules that serve to 
adjudicate ex post violations of the rules of conduct, the principle promotes the virtues of 
uniformity in application and restraint on the potential for abuse of discretion. 
 Yet these aspects of the legality principle play out somewhat differently when applied to 
the core principles than when applied to rules well outside the core. There is little need for 
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special education regarding core principles in order to provide fair notice. Everyone 
understands the prohibition of the core without being told. However, as one moves out from 
the core, people are increasingly less likely to know about a rule or its specific demands. In 
other words, the doctrines of the legality principle ought to be applied much more strictly and 
with a heavier hand as one moves out from the core. 
 The underlying justification for the legality principle also plays out differently regarding 
the principle’s second function: ex post adjudication of violations of the rules of conduct. 
Because humans tend to share a belief in the core principles, there is less danger of disparate 
application. Different decision-makers are likely to share the same intuitions of justice on core 
principles. Again, however, as criminal law rules move out from the core, the potential for 
disparity among decision-makers increases and the law is in greater need of a guiding hand to 
increase uniformity of application. 
 To give a practical example of how the core principles might affect application of the 
legality principle, consider the post-World War II Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leadership. The 
Tribunal found itself in a somewhat awkward situation when it came to charging the leadership 
with the crime of aggressive warmaking. In many ways this charge was foundational, for by 
starting the war through a series of unprovoked aggressions, the Nazis brought upon the world 
all of the death and misery that followed. Unfortunately, at the time, aggressive warmaking was 
not a recognized offense under international law.190 By ignoring this inconvenient fact, in 
apparent violation of the legality principle, is the Tribunal simply engaging in victor’s justice? 
Perhaps not. The fact that the leadership’s aggressive warmaking was so obviously in violation 
of the core principles—whatever the letter of the law at the moment, all humans understood 
that their repeated aggressive warmaking is a gross wrongdoing—means that their convictions 
were indeed legitimate and consistent with the underlying rationales of the legality principle 
taken in the light of criminal law’s core principles. 
 
F. Doctrinal Reform: Recognition of a Mistake of Law Defense 
 
 A mistake as to a matter of fact can provide a defense where the mistake negates an 
offense’s required culpability. Common law commonly limited the defense to cases of mistake 
of fact, but the Model Penal Code sought to allow a mistake of law as a defense if it negated an 
offense element. Even the Model Code, however, continues to otherwise refuse a defense for 
even a reasonable mistake of law.191 Model Code Section 2.02(9) expressly provides that 
culpability as to the criminality of one’s conduct is never to be “read in” or assumed to be an 
offense element; it must be explicitly provided by the offense definition. And rarely is 
culpability as to the unlawfulness of one’s conduct actually an element of an offense. 
 This traditional view is captured by the well-known maxim that “ignorance of the law is 
no excuse,” and it may make sense when applied to the core principles of criminal liability. As 
shown earlier in this Article, ordinary people do not need to have these principles explained to 
them. They understand them intuitively and even at an early stage in their development. And it 
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may well be that when this maxim was first formed under common law,192 let alone under 
Roman Law where it originated,193 the criminal law was fairly bare-bones, extending not too far 
beyond the core principles themselves.194  
 But clearly today’s criminal law is dramatically different.195 Today’s rules extend far 
beyond the core. One criminal law scholar has estimated, for example, that there are now more 
than 300,000 federal offenses.196 And, as we have demonstrated in a variety of ways above, 
rules embodying the core principles and rules out from the core stand in very different 
positions. One might take a different view about whether the mistake-of-law-is-no-defense 
maxim ought to be applied equally to the flood of new criminal law provisions that extend 
beyond the core principles. 
 There certainly has been considerable debate about whether a reasonable mistake or 
ignorance of law ought to be an excuse. Opponents of a mistake of law excuse argue that (1) 
everyone is presumed to know the law;197 (2) those who do not know the law are blameworthy 
for failing to educate themselves;198 (3) the ignorance-is-no-excuse rule has deterrent effect 
and allows criminal law to change social behaviors by encouraging members of society to 
acquaint themselves with the laws;199 and (4) a mistake of law excuse would force courts to 
answer difficult questions, specifically whether a defendant was actually ignorant of the law, 
and whether this ignorance was reasonable.200 
 The arguments in support of a reasonable mistake of law defense include the central 
principle of fairness and due process, as discussed above. Furthermore, proponents of a 
reasonable mistake of law defense refute many of the contentions of the opponents. For 
instance, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the difficulty of administering justice is “no 
ground for refusing to try…unless we are justified in sacrificing individuals to public 
convenience.”201 
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 There is no obvious winner in this dispute because both sides have some legitimate 
points to make. But this is the case primarily because the debate has been framed as one that 
treats all of criminal law as the same. If instead one were to separate the core principles and 
those provisions closely tied to them from the criminal law rules reaching well beyond the core 
principles, the nature of the debate changes. The arguments for a reasonable mistake of law 
excuse become more compelling for provisions well beyond the core principles, although those 
arguments may fall flat when applied to the core principles (and their analogs) themselves. 
Claiming ignorance that taking property of another without consent is a crime is not believable. 
But it may be entirely reasonable, depending on the circumstances, that somebody mistakenly 
concludes that downloading music without a license or any one of the thousands of new 
regulatory offenses is not a crime. 
 This argues for recognizing a mistake of law defense in a case where the offender has 
made an honest mistake and a “reasonable person” could have made the same mistake. The 
existence of the core principles, indicating near universal appreciation for the wrongfulness of 
core conduct, allows us to comfortably recognize such a defense because it assures us that in 
applying the “reasonable person” standard jurors are not all adrift and in danger of regularly 
producing objectionable results. A jury of ordinary people will naturally find it unconvincing 
that a defendant was unaware that a core wrongdoing, such as physical aggression or theft, 
was unlawful, but will find it increasingly believable as the alleged crime grows farther from the 
core. 
 
G. Doctrinal Reform: Formal Recognition of a Mitigation for Partial Excuses 
 
 Current law typically provides a complete excuse defense for offenders who’s cognitive 
or control dysfunctions at the time of the offense are sufficiently severe as to render them 
blameless for their conduct. Insanity, duress, involuntary intoxication, immaturity, and various 
forms of involuntary conduct are commonly recognized as a basis for a complete defense in 
modern criminal codes.202 But the core principle of blameworthiness proportionality suggests 
that the criminal law ought to do more if it is to embody the criminal law’s universal principles. 
 Where the effect of an offender’s mental illness falls just short of the cognitive 
dysfunction required for a complete insanity defense or where the extent of coercion to 
commit the offense falls just short of the amount that would give a complete duress excuse, 
there can be little dispute that the offender stands in an importantly different position than one 
who has committed the offense with no mental illness or coercion. The core principle of 
blameworthiness proportionality, then, would require the recognition of some formal doctrine 
that acknowledges such cases of partial excuse and provides reduced punishment. 
 The criminal law has historically recognized the weight of these arguments but has 
implemented them in only one instance: recognizing a provocation defense to mitigate murder 
to manslaughter, a mitigation that has been somewhat expanded in some modern criminal 
codes to provide a homicide mitigation for a killing committed under “extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance.”203 However, the core principle of blameworthiness proportionality 
requires formal recognition of partial excuses in the full range of excusing conditions. 
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 In practice, a mitigation for a partial excuse might be taken into account by the 
sentencing judge, or might not. Some judges may have the discretion to make such 
adjustments, but others may not because of mandatory minimum sentences or even the terms 
of some sentencing guidelines. Reliance solely upon judicial discretion is also unattractive 
because it excludes jury participation in the decision-making. Judging whether an offender has 
sufficiently reduced blameworthiness due to a partial excuse that justifies a mitigation is the 
kind of classic justice judgment for which juries, not judges, are best suited.204 
 Further, as I have demonstrated in a recent law review article, it is entirely feasible to 
construct a general mitigation provision that can guide such jury decision-making, signaling to 
jurors the factors they should think about, and increasing uniformity in the application of the 
general mitigation.205 Such a system would both provide desirable jury involvement and reduce 
the disparity that is inevitable under the current system under which individual sentencing 
judges exercise their unbridled discretion without even a legislative hint as to whether they 
should even consider a mitigation in cases of partial excuse. 
 
H. The Feasibility of Creating an International Criminal Law 
 
 As previously discussed, a criminal justice system gains many benefits from reflecting its 
society’s shared intuitions of justice, including greater legitimacy and compliance with its 
rules.206 In contrast, a regime that deviates from society’s principles of justice is viewed as 
lacking credibility and undeserving of deference. This has led some scholars to conclude that 
creating a desert-based international criminal law is, practically speaking, infeasible. That, they 
argue, is because people’s justice judgments are “deeply culturally contingent” and there is 
“enormous variation” in global views towards crime and punishment.207 
 If it were true that there are no universal principles of justice, then indeed a desert-
based international system would be impracticable. Every international criminal law rule would 
violate some communities’ judgments of what is just. Accordingly, any legal regime would have 
to be local, or at most national, in scope. 
 Other scholars have recognized that widely shared moral intuitions about justice and 
punishment do exist. However, they conclude that such consensus exists across cultures only at 
a “very high level of abstraction,”208 such that it cannot be operationalized in real-world cases. 
But these concerns about the feasibility of an international criminal law are warranted only if 
agreed-upon principles were exclusively local. The existence of core principles, which are 
universally accepted across demographics and cultures, provides a foundation upon which an 
international criminal law can be built. As shown in Part III, there is broad agreement as to the 
core of wrongdoing and the relative blameworthiness of offenders. Across time, cultures, and 
even civilizations, humans have had similar intuitions on these issues. This includes factoring in 
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an offender’s mitigating circumstances, including acting in self-defense, lacking a culpable state 
of mind, or lacking sufficient capacity to understand or control one’s conduct. 
 Focusing specifically on the idea of an international criminal law, Eric Blumenson argues 
that:  
 
The complex beliefs that underwrite retributive justice are common to most criminal 
justice systems, but they are neither universal nor self-evident. For example, the 
retributive imperative of punishment is suspect or worse in many faiths, senseless 
according to many utilitarians, and unduly focused on the defendant and the past 
according to some restorative justice advocates.209 
 
It may well be that Jesus Christ might turn the other cheek but there is little evidence that 
communities of any faith, be they Christian, Islamic, Hindu, or other, disagree with the core 
principles including the first, calling for punishment of blameworthy wrongdoing. The evidence 
presented in Parts II and III makes this clear. Similarly, it may well be that some academic crime-
control utilitarians argue for different principles but, again, the evidence is overwhelming that 
they are arguing for a position on which most of humanity has a contrary view. 
 Blumenson also appears to confound the degree of punishment with its form. As 
mentioned in Part V.D, where we urge the greater use of restorative processes, the appropriate 
form of punishment is not part of core principles. Punishment can take various forms that can 
be entirely consistent with restorative processes or other ideals. And allocating punishment 
according to core principles of justice can further the utilitarians’ goals by building the criminal 
law’s moral credibility. 
 The existence of the core principles suggests that it is indeed feasible to construct an 
international criminal law that will have broad support. It may well be that, to maintain its 
moral credibility, international criminal law will need to limit itself to those areas close to the 
core principles, and at least for the time being to forgo legislation out from the core on which 
there is disagreement. On the other hand, it is also true that in our increasingly interconnected 
world, once an international criminal code is established, if it earns broad moral credibility by 
initially sticking to core principles, it may be able to help bring about greater agreement out 
from the core. 
 
I. Creating a Criminal Code for an As Yet Nonexistent Population: The NEOM Project 
 
 Saudi Arabia is in the process of creating from scratch a mega city in the northwestern 
region of its territory to serve as a global hub for trade, innovation, and knowledge.210 
Announced in October 2017, the project is part of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, a framework for 
the Kingdom to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on oil. NEOM, a combination of 
the Greek word for “new” and the Arabic word for “future”—as the zone is called—will 
encourage Saudis to spend domestically by housing its own auto factories, hospitals, tech 
companies, and resorts. More generally, the 10,230 square mile zone will focus on industries 
including entertainment, energy, biotechnology, and advanced manufacturing. According to 
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leaked documents, a huge artificial moon, glow-in-the-dark beaches, flying drone-powered 
taxis, robotic maids to clean homes, and a Jurassic Park-style attraction featuring animatronic 
dinosaurs are among the many futuristic features planned for the project.211 Its location 
bordering the Red Sea and the Suez Canal positions the independent economic zone on one of 
the most important trade routes. 
 The Saudi government, the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia, and local and 
international investors are expected to put more than $500 billion into NEOM, with the 
expected completion of phase one in 2025. Once completed, NEOM is expected to serve as the 
home and workplace for over a million citizens from around the globe and a wide variety of 
religions, homelands, and backgrounds. 
 The territory the size of Massachusetts will function largely as a separate country. This 
includes having its own “independent systems and regulations [to] ensure the availability of 
best services without social limitations,” such as its own laws, taxes, regulations, and an 
“autonomous judicial system,” separate from the existing governmental framework in the 
Kingdom.212 NEOM officials have said its law “will be based on best practices in the areas of 
economic and business law, as well as feedback from potential investors and residents.”213 
According to its website, NEOM will support an “international ethos” with a “progressive law 
compatible with international norms.”214 The idea behind adopting international legal best 
practices is that NEOM must provide legal assurances for conflict resolution and enforcement 
that will attract foreign investors. The city’s civil and criminal law must also be such that citizens 
from around the world will feel comfortable making NEOM their home.  
 But if the new territory is to have a legal system that will seem attractive to persons 
from all over the globe, is that even possible? If so, what would such a criminal law look like? 
There is not even an existing population that one could test to determine shared judgments of 
justice. 
 The previous parts of this Article suggest that drafting such a criminal code—for an as 
yet nonexistent population—is indeed feasible. First, the criminal code drafters ought to 
commit themselves to a criminal code that has as its foundations the core principles of criminal 
liability shown in Part III to reflect what are essentially universally shared principles of justice. 
To fill in additional details of a code, the drafters will need to extrapolate from these general 
principles and to add value judgments held by the larger global community, which may or may 
not track those of the current residents of Saudi Arabia. 
 As demonstrated, the universal acceptance of the core principles marks them out as 
different from other criminal law rules. This has important implications for the drafters of the 
NEOM criminal code. If the code were to incorporate doctrines that significantly stray from the 
core, the risk of disapproval from some portion of NEOM’s future residents increases. To 
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succeed in its unique goal of appeasing persons from all walks of life, NEOM’s criminal law 
drafters should stay as close to the core principles as possible. And as they add detail beyond 
the core principles, they ought to consult current global views on the strength of the analogy to 
the core. Do most people globally see insider trading as analogous to the core wrongs of taking 
without consent and deceit in exchanges? If so, then the drafters are probably on firm ground 
in producing a criminal code that has legitimacy and moral credibility with the community even 
though they still have no idea who that community will be.  
 
J. Intergalactic Rules of War 
  
 Many who have studied the topic have concluded that it is highly likely that there is 
intelligent life somewhere in the galaxy, and nearly certain within the vastness of the universe. 
Recent discoveries of the conditions in which life has been found to thrive on our own planet 
show the wide range of habitats that can support life. Scientists in the emerging field of 
astrobiology now believe that life can evolve in any environment where there are enough flows 
of matter or energy to power chemical reactions. Critics may point out that life on Earth follows 
one predominate pattern subject to tolerances of pressure, temperature, radiation, and 
atmospheric content, but such arguments speak more to our own biases regarding the 
development of life and ignore both the co-development of life and atmospheric conditions 
within our biological system and instances of organisms living in extreme conditions in our own 
backyard.4 Our “planet became inhabited as soon as it was habitable. Once the sterilizing 
impacts died down, Earth sprang to life—in less than a couple hundred million years, and 
maybe much faster.”5 This too leads to the conclusion that where life can begin, it will begin. 
The universe is teeming with life, and the very same forces driving organisms to explore and 
adapt into intelligent life virtually guarantees our inevitable contact with extraterrestrial beings. 
 If contact with extraterrestrial beings is inevitable, this begs the question of what our 
encounter with them might look like. They may be in search of resources that we have. Or they 
may see us as a resource. Perhaps they may wish to exchange resources or knowledge, or 
simply be curious about who we are. Either way, the uncertainty around the encounter means 
that our first contact with extraterrestrial beings will have some tension inherent in it. This is 
particularly so for a species that is intelligent and advanced enough to make contact with us. 
Without knowing their motivations, the risk for a confrontation can only be assumed to be high. 
And if they have the capability to harm the human species as a whole, it would be rational for 
us to be prepared to attack first, if that appears to be the only sure way of preserving our 
species. 
 But without additional evidence about the characteristics of any such extraterrestrial 
being, our best guess may actually be that they would share some of our interests in peace and 
against unjustified aggression. If a mutual interest in harmony could be persuasively signaled 
and understood, the tension in the interaction may be alleviated. Preventing a violent conflict 
would require that we deal with them in a manner that they will perceive as fair and just, and 
avoid conduct that they would see as wrongful. 
 
4 From an ex ante perspective, the oxygenation of our own atmosphere would seem apocalyptic to life on this 
planet since oxygen is toxic to the simple organisms from which we evolved. We know from hindsight that such 
hypotheses are rash at best. Substances toxic to one organism have a knack of becoming sustenance for others. 




 Given that we are referring to an extraterrestrial species, it might be expected that they 
will be so different from humans that it would be hopeless to try to guess what their rules of 
conduct might be. But to become advanced enough to make contact with us, we should 
actually expect that they are a species that has similar sociality and cooperation among 
themselves as we have. We could deduce from that shared character some predictable values 
that they and we would share, and notions of wrongful conduct may well be one of them. 
 If it is true that human intuitions of fairness and justice are a predictable product of our 
social nature, whether through evolutionary effect as discussed in Part IV, or the effect of the 
common socialization that comes with living in a social existence, then one might speculate that 
similar evolutionary effects or socialization experiences may guide the development of other 
species that live a similarly social life. As noted previously, there are significant advantages that 
come with social organization. One example is the mutually beneficial effects of reciprocity: if 
you share with me today in exchange for my sharing with you yesterday, we are both better off 
than if neither of us share. In social species, reciprocity can involve such things as alerting other 
group members when food has been discovered, sharing food over time, or supporting a 
comrade in action against others. While social cooperation is better overall than selfishness, a 
cheater could theoretically outperform the others if he were able to regularly take benefits 
without repaying them. In the end, the most successful cooperators are not those who always 
cooperate, but rather those who cooperate selectively with other cooperators, and discriminate 
against those who are not reliable in cooperative endeavors. Put another way, effective 
cooperation requires rewarding good behavior and punishing bad behavior.  
 For an extraterrestrial species advanced enough to come in contact with humans, it 
would not be surprising that their process of developing a cooperative society required the 
development of core principles similar to those underlying our cooperative existence. Thus, in 
judging how best to engage with extraterrestrials and to signal our interest in a cooperative 




 This Article has challenged the standard view that criminal law scholars and 
policymakers are free to construct criminal law rules by focusing exclusively on the criminal 
justice theory of the day. It shows that this “blank slate” conception of criminal lawmaking is 
dangerously misguided. In truth, lawmakers are writing on a slate on which core principles are 
already indelibly written and realistically they are free only to add detail in the implementation 
of those principles and to add additional provisions not inconsistent with them. Attempts to do 
otherwise are destined to produce tragic results from both utilitarian and retributivist 
perspectives. 
 The Article has also challenged the common view that no such core principles of 
criminal law exist, that criminal law is something on which everyone necessarily disagrees 
because justice judgments are so dependent on personal and cultural perspectives. However, 
by examining a wide variety of sources—including issues on which there is high agreement 
across demographics within a society, issues on which there is agreement cross culturally, 
issues emerging early in the historical development of formal criminal law, issues reflected in 




principles commonly appearing in natural experiments of groups beyond the reach of law—the 
Article has isolated nine core principles on which there appears to be near universal agreement.  
 One might speculate about why such core principles exist, and the Article does, but 
whatever the reason—be it an evolutionarily created genetic predisposition or a process of 
generalized learning common to all social groups—the existence of such core principles has 
important and diverse practical implications: in suggesting reduced crime-control effectiveness 
where the criminal law conflicts with a core principle, in setting limitations and strategies for 
social reform, in supporting a broader use of restorative justice, in suggesting a more nuanced 
application of the legality principle, in supporting the recognition of a general mistake of law 
defense and a mitigation for partial excuses, in assessing the feasibility of creating an 
international criminal law or of creating a criminal law for a territory whose population does 
not yet exist, and even in planning strategies for dealing with initial contact with extraterrestrial 
beings.  
 The implications of core principles do not play ideological favorites. On the one hand, 
they suggest significant limitations on some favorite progressive goals, such as the abolition of 
punishment. On the other hand, they also suggest the recognition of a general mistake of law 
defense and formal mitigation for partial excuses, as well as the increased use of restorative 
justice. The ultimate goal here is not to promote one political agenda or another but rather to 
understand the reality of human nature and the significant implications it has for the 
formulation of criminal law. 
 
